

**JIMMA UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF LAW AND GOVERNANCE
DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES**

**Academic Attitude towards the Democratic Developmental State of Ethiopia: A case
Study of Bonga College of Teachers Education**

A study By:

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**Academic Attitude towards the Democratic Developmental State of Ethiopia: A case
Study of Bonga College of Teachers Education**

By

Belachew Betela

A Thesis

*Submitted to the Department of Governance and Development Studies, College of Law and
Governance, Jimma University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Masters of Arts in Governance and Development Studies*

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October, 2016

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Declaration

I declare that this thesis work entitled “Academic Attitude towards the Democratic Developmental State of Ethiopia: A case Study of Bonga College of Teachers Education.” is my original work, and has not been presented earlier for award of any degree to any other University, and that all sources of material used for the thesis have been accordingly acknowledged. I have produced it independently except for the guidance of my advisor.

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Acknowledgment

Usual to any scientific approach to establish organized knowledge, the efforts to accomplish the study is not without help from others. Thus my primary respect goes to my advisor Miss Eline Joor; tireless efforts she provided and for her encouragement, guidance, and professional expertise to accomplish this work. I also thank her for special help in identifying appropriate materials standard indexes to review. My thanks' also goes for my former co-advisor to help replace as major advisor to accomplish the work after Eline's left for vacation. Next to my advisors I thank Bonga College of Teachers Education for its special financial help and support across all the process and in facilitating data collection. More again my thank goes' to all participants to the sample in college for their collaboration to reflect their impressions to the questions in case. Their motivation to provide relevant information is always in mind and heart. My special thanks also go to all my family. I also thank my classmate Maerge Fikadu for his guidance in feeding quantitative data points in to statistical package for social science and identify commands appropriate to modeling variables in question for analysis.

ABSTRACT

The objective of this study is to examine effects associated with “system level institutional legacies” on developmental efforts to bring socio-economic transformation by assessing perceived level of demand for democracy and satisfaction with supply. Considering field experience as reflections associated with institutional memories of “hierarchy and secrecy;” the study states that an effort to accelerate socio-cultural transformation has issues those can affect its process before full transition. As matter of empirical and theoretical fact, such factors are identified as cause that conditioned sense of partisanship, self-defense and mistrust among socio-political actors. Thus by employing mixed approach as research methodology and “demand-supply” model for democracy as empirical approach, the study aimed to identify whether regressive institutional legacies or challenges internal to transitional process; affected likely level of support for democracy. For such end the study used theory of regime support used to assess support for democracy in a given socio-cultural context as theoretical framework to help guide expected link between propositions and results. The overall procedures employed to collect data , analyze and verify results reveal that; there is only 23% of demand for democracy, 30% satisfaction with its supply, least level of trust towards public institutions, its actors, more especially at local level and extreme corruption perception. More than any other factor, cultural memory of “partisan” organizational identity appears most special institutional memory; in conditioning support for democracy, satisfaction with current supply and public and private end of such support. This implies that effects of traditional institutional legacies of hierarchy and secrecy remains living memory until expected structural transformation and socio-political value change towards democracy. Thus the review recommends that the regime has yet to transform shadow of old image drawn in its new territory.

Key words: *secrecy and hierarchy, self defense, partisanship, institutional legacy, support for democracy,*

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background of the Study

As matter of theoretical fact, scholars argue that nations in transition has challenges associated with cultural legacies and troubles usual to transitional process, ahead of expected structural transformation. Informed by such theoretical facts the case refers the following cultural legacies of: “*hierarchy, secrecy, self-defense, mutual mistrust and intolerance*” as an issue empirical to Ethiopia’s institutional past those can matter current efforts to build democracy as stated by (Tesfaye Habiso, 2015 and Levin, 2008:1). Tesfaye and Levin identifies the issues as most damaging cultural legacy responsible not only for lost opportunities in political past but also remains powerful challenge; affecting current efforts to negotiate for democracy, political difference and bring institutional progress. Thus considering the issues as challenge special to Ethiopian institutional past and burdens, inevitable to any nations in transition; the thesis considers covering study gap regarding how such institutional memories can affect demand for democracy and satisfaction with current supply. That means in addition to findings by earlier researchers about effects associated with regressive institutional legacy of hierarchy and secrecy, those to matter efforts to build modern political society with mutual end; this study examines the issue in relation to support for democracy and satisfaction with supply.

In consideration to effects associated with inherited institutional legacies on citizen’s attitude towards democracy, Diamond (1999: 162) identifies that public “*experience*” with idea of democracy matter more than any other factors to sustain support for it in. This is also why Afro-barometer scholars as Robert Matte (2001:1) identify least level of support for democracy in Africa though the fact that “*new democracies*” need a large number of democrats if democracy is to become “*only game in town*” (by quoting Linz and Stephan’s 1996: 15) evidence. Pipe Norris (1999) defines “*Democrats*” as those citizens in a society that display ultimate support – “*commitment*” for democracy as the most appropriate form of government; thus disregard all other, non-democratic forms of government (Norris, 1999: 219). Inglehart (1993) also adds that support for democracy must go beyond “*lip service*”; towards real commitment through total rejection of any of traditional institutional alternatives employed as system for governance in history.

As informed case with primary “aim” to assess attitudinal position of population in case towards developmental democracy; the study identifies level of support for democracy, satisfaction with supply and issues that affected both. As derived by theoretical proposition and empirical experience at field settings as reflections associated with institutional legacies of hierarchy and secrecy; the study reveals influence of such values on support for democracy as general and satisfaction with supply in particular.

Given the assertion that not only democracy but also strategies to forge alliance from civil bureaucracy in addition to political bureaucracy to succeed 21st century developmental efforts to bring institutional change; the study identifies issues those affected demand for democracy and satisfaction with supply. Thus inconsideration to such theoretical and empirical issues, the study provides case based insight at organizational level unlike usual studies at national or system level and spiral entry to fill study gap at agency [personal] level. Moreover the study considers Norris insight that critical citizens, as in case, with advanced educational skill have unique effects on the process of building democracy (P .Norris, 1999). This is clear from the fact that popular determination for democracy differs not only from country to country, but also among group of classes in the society; then the case identify necessary issues those mattered developmental search to expand scope of alliance for its complex process. For the case Whitehead asserts that the path to democracy is rich in variety in terms of the groups involved; issues matter them; methods adopted, opportunity at hand (Whitehead; 1992).

In general the study examines issues associated with macro-level institutional values to understand its impacts on micro processes at basic level. That means the study examines empirical experience on the ground as effects associated with regressive institutional legacy and theoretical information that: *institutional legacies matters reform efforts to bring progressive institutional change as enduring effects associated with such ex-institutional values on citizens attitude towards alternative policy objects(Almond and Powell 1978:25)*. To help such end the study considers participant observation and theory of regime support as respective empirical and analytical approaches to define the problem, review related study, identify instruments for data collection and help inform analysis process. Thus thanks to “*Afro-barometer*” research unit; the review identified “*demand-supply*” model, as established standard frameworks to construct tools for data collection and structure reviews process.

1.2. Statement of the problem

Since 1990 onwards developmental democracy is adopted as major reform package to respond institutional stagnation and to transform socio-political conditions. That means it is adopted as instrument to capacitate institutional functioning, build democracy and bring socio-cultural and economic transformation. However as theoretical fact and observed reality, major reform efforts after prolonged institutional failure cannot be without challenges. The issue appears that a nation in transitional process of change has two basic challenges to confront: “*enduring effects of traditional cultural values that drag back to its status quo, as remaining institutional memory at one hand (Inglehart 2005) and “adoptive pressure” internal to transitional process at other hand*” (Roderick: 2003). Mkandawire, (2001)) adds that though the state capacity is most basic tool to respond diverse factors that can condition developmental relevance and to help successful implementation of its socio-economic policies; it can also be affected by other counteracting forces. He claims that such a capacity is determined by various factors as: institutional, socio-cultural, administrative, technical or political (Mkandawire 2001: 291). Thus as matter of scholar assertion above and actual experience at ground, the study states that nations like Ethiopia with major reform efforts in transition, have burdens to accommodate its motivation with the root where it surfaced and issues those can matter its process.

In recognition to these theoretical facts and regressive institutional legacies; the study aims to identify whether system level cultural legacies or troubles internal to transitional process affected demand for democracy and satisfaction with developmental supply. Thus considering field experience as challenges associated with traditional cultural values; the study aims to identify basis and structure of effects associated with such institutional memory on academic attitude towards developmental democracy. In other words the study; concerns to justify observed state of affairs at micro level of field settings as issues that can affect support for democracy and trust about its socio-political institutions and actors. Thus to keep quality of results and methodological rules associated with study based on lived fielded settings; the study take Bonga college of teacher education as adequate boundary to explain sample character, determine sample size, control observed experience and show adequacy of findings.

Moreover in their recent advice developmental scholars claim that developmental approaches of 21st century should have to be not only democratic but also ensure professional alliance of civil

bureaucracy in addition to political bureaucracy (Evans and Rauch 1999: 748-65.; Olsen 2008: 13-37). From both theoretical reasons and empirical cases they assert that; it is wrong to examine bureaucratic capacity, separate from whole staffing policy or human resources considerations. Thus the study states that assessing attitude of such required human resource towards democracy in general and developmental regime in particular provides issues those affected demand-supply perception of sample in case. These in turn provides clues to articulate source of support required for developmental strive for democracy and structural transformation, given burdens common to nations in the transitional process of socio-political change.

However it has become clear that there is lack of study and likely findings regarding issues that matter citizens interest as individual actors except excessive focus of all developmental scholars on structural issues of economic growth. According to Haggard (2004); it is unwise to provide exclusive focus for socio-economic success and institutional structure, derived by the concept of national interest, without understanding interest of individuals or groups towards such structure and success (Haggard, 2004:70). Hoogvelt also adds that beyond such concerned attempts to succeed developmental efforts by institutional crafting and economic growth; the process of building both developmental institutions and sustaining such desired economic growth itself also, largely determined by a particular geopolitical, cultural or historical context on the ground (Hoogvelt 1987: 213). Thus the study states institutional memories of secrecy and hierarchy as rules to justify the problem by assessing commitment for democracy and satisfaction with supply to prove its association with field experience at natural settings,

This is more special and imperative when greater number of “*critical group of citizens*” expands with developmental efforts to mass education, as top issue to support its endeavor to bring change and experience with democracy. “Critical group of citizens” in here implies to those citizens with advanced educational attainment as in case and democratic impacts associated with such level of knowledge. That means as matter of theoretical fact; such groups of citizens are found to be least satisfied with what a given regime achieves as outcome and less trusted with its actors, institutions, except ideal commitment for concept of democracy Norris (1999a). Thus the study states that the opinion from such group of citizen’s essential because not only they are “*critical group of citizens*” but also are acquainted with required cognitive awareness to help

burdens usual to process of building democracy and such alliance cannot be achieved without understanding their attitude towards democracy.

In empirical sense the very motivation developmental approach adopted in 1990's as political strategy to ensure likely economic growth and transformation in Ethiopia, also provides grounds to anticipate challenges to its process. That is developmental regime adopted as response to address century old institutional problems of hierarchy and secrecy. The problems are identified as factors, responsible for not only for such failure but also prevented any organized attempts made by progressive socio-political actors to bring structural change along entire 20th century (Levin 2008:1). As question to the case, the issue is more pressing in formal institutional settings, where ruling classes and its massive bureaucracy exercises informal game at expense of formal socio-economic affairs of state, as civil and political wing (Tesfaye Habiso, 2016).

In general, the study states the common fact that culture as origin for individual and group system of values and beliefs; imposes powerful impact on citizen's orientations that define and shape actual or perceived meaning of institutional purpose. This in turn becomes source of support or barrier to achieve desired end. This is the reason why Mkandawire (2010) asserts that:

“The construction of a developmental state in Africa needs to be contextualized, taking account of each country's specific historical, cultural, political, ideological and institutional settings” (as quoted by Edigheji 2010: 18).

Thus driving scholar assertion as by Stake (1995) as relevant guide to craft study design and determine sample size; the investigator claims his prolonged experience as rule to justify special focus provide to sample unit as adequate case to explain the question. According to Stake (1995); if the field experience used as opportunity to identify research problem; the issues of study design, commonality of sample size and relevance of the outcome becomes function to respond questions behind issues being studied. Stake argues that the researcher's view of the generic and specific properties of a single case provides a basis for sampling decisions. By referring theory of “*symbolic interactional-ism*,” he argue that every case is a sample of its broader population; as similarities across a population are greater than differences between populations; it is appropriate to treat each case as being, in general terms, representative of their population.

Thus the study states observed field experience and effects associated with institutional legacies of hierarchy and secrecy as empirical rules to justify the problem beyond theoretical fact that traditional institutional legacies affect reform measures to adjust such legacies on efforts towards

progressive end. In turn the study covers the knowledge gap that 21st century developmental regime not only be bureaucratic but also should have to be democratic and farm embedded alliance that go beyond exclusive issues of committed leadership towards holistic issues of human resource at all levels of public sector. It also covers knowledge gap at individual level or lack of studies to identify issues that matter their interest as personal agency, due to unilateral focus of all developmental scholars on structural issues of economic development based on concept of national interest and survival as stated by Haggard (2004:70-71). Thus by recognizing field experience as problem and lack of studies regarding effects of institutional legacies on support for democracy; the study states the issue as gap that can affect civic rights and duties of individuals and groups in an institutional relationship.

1.3. Objective of research

1.3.1. General objectives:

The first aim of the case is to assess academic attitude towards democracy in general and satisfaction with developmental supply in particular. The second general aim of the study is to develop empirical and theoretical explanation on level of demand for democracy and satisfaction with developmental supply or achievement.

1.3.2. Specific objectives

- To assess academic attitude towards democracy and its supply in relation to current developmental regime
- To identify impacts of system level institutional legacies on “*demand-supply*” perception of academic staffs in Bonga college of teachers Education towards current developmental regime of Ethiopia
- To identify whether such regressive institutional legacies or challenges internal to transitional process; appear main conditioning factor on demand for democracy and satisfaction with developmental supply.
- To identify issues that influence support for democracy and satisfaction with developmental supply among instructors in college and school teachers
- To conduct theoretical review used to identify effects associated with cultural manifestation of institutional legacies those determine individual or group attitude towards major institutional reform in transitional process

1.4. Research Questions

The study concerned to examine the following main and sub questions as:

Main question – How do academic staffs in Bonga College of teacher’s education perceive democratic developmental state of Ethiopia?

Specific questions:

1. How effects associated with institutional legacies of hierarchy and secrecy do identify itself as remaining cultural memory among academic staffs in sample?
2. To what extent do such regressive institutional legacies matter academic demand for democracy and satisfaction with developmental supply?

3. How much the observation that satisfaction with developmental supply among instructors is far less than primary school teachers in sample met the expectation?

1.5. Ethical considerations

Informed by Steven Terrell's (2011) guidelines to qualitative research; the study claims that the processes of investigation is ethical as:

- The process of participation is voluntarily
- Participants made clear about the purpose of the study.
- The participants have the right to a copy of the results
- Participant's privacy has been respected.
- The topic is free of bias towards any group (as age, ethnicity, political orientation, race, gender, etc.)

1.6. Limitation to Study

The case concerns the following theoretical and practical issues as limits to the study as:

Theoretical limits –scholars assert that though attitude is most essential behavioral approaches to measure public perception; it is not only complex in nature and derived by mixes of ideologies, experiences, partisan positions, emotions and misunderstandings but also highly dynamic and change from time to time, society to society and group to group based on external stimuli and deeply held values. However the article has ground to offset such limits that methodological scholars assert that “*case based studies*” inspired by real situation with clear parameters to structure study; ensures not only necessary issues required to validate the findings, but also provides basic insight and point of reference for other cases with related topics to study.

Empirically – The case is limited to Bonga College of Teachers Education and difficulty to get sample unit (instructors) in case on time, left the college to mentor practicum students dispersed to primary schools, partner to college training program. The other empirical challenge is reluctance of some instructors to reflect and share their understanding for the interview and discussion in question. However the investigator has ground to offset such empirical limitations that the instructors to the college are so diverse both in terms of their origin or geography, social composition, religion and age...etc and the questions to the case are empirical, concerned to examine observed state of affair to understand essence of real experience for five year participant observation in college.

1.7. Thematic parameters identified to structure, code and collect data

Thanks to scholars in “*Afro-barometer*” research team; the study employed the following “*standard*” themes with respective indexes to construct codes, collect data and help analysis and consequent integrity and adequacy of results as:

Support or demand for democracy: - implies to degree of commitment for democracy, which is found as function of outright rejection of any non democratic alternatives [as one party regime, traditional chiefs or aristocracy, centralized presidential dictatorship], those conditions political motivation of citizen’s as remaining institutional memory usual to most nations new to idea of democracy.

Performance of democracy—expressed in terms of quality and subsequent satisfaction, referred from political and economic goods and services, a given regime, sustain for its constituencies as individual and group.

Support for elements to build democracy in 3rd world: – for both theoretical reasons and the review in case, support for elements to democracy in here refers to support for contextual values and strategies concerned to help transitional process of building democracy in traditional countries, new to idea of democratic politics. That means support for elements to democracy in transition differs from usual principles referred as elements to typical liberal and other consolidated democracy in most first and some emerging countries, due to unique socio-political contexts associated with each of those traditional society and adjustment costs associated with efforts to build democracy and achieve socio-political transformation.

State Capacity and Government Performance - expressed in terms of government enforcement of laws and its ability to solve public issues in terms of policy performance regarding issues of poverty reduction, corruption, education, employment, equity, and performance of representative political agents at different level of socio-political institutions and organizations of the state.

Social or political trust – though social or political trust are closely linked concepts, perhaps different sides of the same coin; “social trust” is a feature of the most basic level of community on which political trust surfaces, while “political trust: refers primarily to attitudes about political institutions and leaders. Moreover social trust is regarded as a strong determinant of, or influence upon, political support of various kinds, including support for the political community, confidence on its institution and trust on political leaders. As a result it is believed that the

accumulation of social capital, in the form of social trust, will also result in the accumulation of political capital, difficult without culture of respect, trust and tolerance in social background. From pure political point of view, “*trust*” is conceptualized as “a basic evaluative orientation of public toward the government founded on how well the regime is operating according to people’s normative expectations.”

Responsiveness –Extent of public agency motivation to listen and serve citizens quest for public service based on principles of accountability and transparency.

Corruption perception: - refers to perceived range of corruption by public towards respective socio-economic and political agents including head of state or government at top, to local councils at bottom and other socio-economic agencies, acting as public and private entities. Informed by methodological assertions that the rules to measure such perception; the study constructed five point scale data collection instruments for quantitative part of codes and concept analysis or thematic classification of reflections collected from qualitative codes and methods with aim to implore necessary textual and verbal information.

1.8. Key words and conceptual terms used to inform design and explain the study

Adoptive pressure: implies to challenges associated with adjustment costs usual to reform efforts in transition with aims to address massive institutional failure through major structural redirection of socio-political relation. Adoptive pressure becomes enduring challenge for nations in transitional process of structural change, until full socio-political and industrial transformation. That means structural redirection of traditional socio-political system challenges because not only it is new to long established traditional institutional values but also such structural adjustment involves socio-economic winners and losers which in turn shuffles class structure and socio-political status or composition. Lucian Payee defines the term in relation to trouble usual to 3rd world nations with novel efforts to bring structural change and democratic socio-political progress. He calls the issue as “*identity crisis*” associated with resistance against newly adopted structural redirection and complex effects brought with such change on preexisting socio-political identity, composition, status, purpose, norms or values. Dalton (1994) calls the issue as “*adjustment cost*” paid to bring structural change and socio-political transformation.

Capable bureaucracy – a bureaucracy emerged with developmental model, used to support developmental process not only through rule based Weberian procedures with professional qualification but also acting in the public interest or priority with actual and behavioral norm of developmental spirit in serving national goals.

Case study - scholars as Yin (2002) define Case study as a study that investigate a distinct situation including “many more variables of interest than data points,” He adds that Case study

as process of examining an issues based on multiple lines of evidence for triangulating purposes and avails or identifies itself from “prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis” (Yin, 2002, pp. 13-14). For Merriam (1998) qualitative case study refers to “holistic, intensive or deep description and analysis of a bounded phenomenon’s as a program, an institution, a person, a process, a social unit”:p. xiii.

Critical Citizens” – critical citizens are citizens with high degree of tolerance but difficult to frame their trust towards political institutions, authorities and to reach their increasingly higher set of performance standards they seek from a given regime while according a great value to democracy. As found by empirical study; higher levels of education, lead citizens to be not only more critical but also least satisfied with regime performance and the way democracy works, except ideal commitment to written principles that the regime embodies.

Demand for democracy – implies to support for democracy that goes beyond simple approval [what Ignart calls “*lip service*”] for democracy as best system of government towards actual commitment by outright rejection of any other traditional or non democratic alternatives in an institutional or cultural past.

New democracies - implies to name given to fresh democracies (both liberal and other alternative versions) mostly emerged in 1960’s onward with 3rd wave democratic expansion in countries eccentric to concept and practice of democratic political tradition.

New institutionalism –this theory claims that political relation as combined process that affects and affected by historical, social and rational values and structures. It claims that socio-cultural values and structures and the way it defined and organized in history affects not only socio-political motivation of individuals and groups but also becomes autonomous structural, cognitive and rational criteria of barrier or facility to institutional progress of society. They also claims reciprocal, interdependent and equally important roles and influences state, culture or society and individuals, can impose on one another, on their institutional functioning and progress.

Political Culture – refers to extent to which a particular society has a democratic orientation in its political culture. According to Almond and Verba; it refers “distribution of (political) patterns or orientation” (1963:13). For Schumpeter (1947:294-5); it implies “*democratic self-control*” meaning obeying undesirable laws, tolerating different opinions and refraining from irresponsible opposition. He calls the concept as the “democratic method”.

Political status - as one of basic dimension to institutional identity, political status implies to organizational attachment, in which citizens identify and perceive themselves as winner, loser, non partisan or neutral, more especially on issues of party politics, new to young democracies in the process of transition.

Political socialization – implies to the process or the way individuals and groups socialized in political relation of given society. It is defined as the process by which individuals acquire beliefs, values and habits of thought and action related to government, politics, and society. Political socialization is a process by which people acquire political values not simply during active political participation but even before engaging themselves in political activities. Political socialization, therefore, includes all formal, informal, deliberate and unplanned; learning at every stage of life.

Research Philosophy or world views – scholars as (Guba, 1990) use the term *worldview* as meaning “a basic set of beliefs that guide action” (p. 17). Others call it as *paradigms* (Lincoln, Lynham, & Guba, 2011; Mertens, 2010); *epistemologies* and *ontologies* (Crotty, 1998), or *broadly conceived research methodologies* (Neuman, 2009). Creswell (2014) see worldviews as a general philosophical orientation about the world and the nature of research that a researcher brings to a study. Worldviews arise based on discipline orientations, students or advisors/mentors inclinations, and past research experiences. The types of beliefs held by individual researchers based on these factors will often lead to embracing a qualitative, quantitative, or mixed methods approach in their research. He identifies four widely discussed world views used to guide research approach in the literature: post-positivism, constructivism, transformative-ism and pragmatism, (p: 37).

Role theory – claims that patterns of human conduct involve roles with expectations, identities and social positions, structure and individual responses. This theory links the functioning of the social order and political relation with the characteristics and behavior of the individuals who make it up. Role theory has been highly successful in explaining realities at personal and societal levels.

Structural functional theory- claims that all political and non political (civil) agents have structural function to play in preserving socio-political process and entire social system.

Transition – as most reviewed term in political science, transition implies to transition of a given society or state from long established system of political arrangements and socio-economic mode of production towards new, progressive and democratic mode of material and non material pattern of production and exchange. It is the process by which societies make the transition from one social order to another. The word has more especial usage to express evolution of certain state or society from traditional to modern or autocratic to democratic institutional system of relation and mode of production.

Unit of Analysis – According to Purina Patel (2009:3) unit of analysis refers to specific sample unit(s) to explain case(s) or issues of interest in question at its most basic level. In other words it implies to the most elementary unit in focus to explain issue being studied or observed. Some examples of unit of analysis include individuals, household(s), court case(s), institution(s), countries, states, firm(s), industries, etc. Accordingly for this thesis, unit of analysis is “*persons*” working as public employee in Bonga College of Teachers Education.

CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

2.1. Meaning and concept of developmental state

Considering lack of concretely established theoretical frame to explain concept of developmental state; African union commission identify an integrated analytical framework to picture developmental proposition. Accordingly Economic commission for Affric (2011:118) identify “*capacity based development theory*” and *neo-patrimonial theory* known as “*rent management theory*”, as framework to define the concept of developmental state, by referring origin of successful developmental efforts and experiences among nations in Europe, Africa and Asia. Thus scholars conceptualize developmental state from differing perspectives including socio-cultural, political, and institutional and even from cognitive point of view.

According to Ujo (1994) “*development*” can be conceptualized as both physical process and mental set or state of mind among individuals and groups. The basic proposition is that though institutions matter social-political progress; the question of where does such institutions come from becomes another issue to explain impact of institutional function on progress. Considering cultural function of institutional values and enduring nature of effects associated with long established legacies on behavioral orientation of society; he argues that reform efforts to sustain institutional progress depends not only on its origins and outcome but also normative or cultural criteria individuals and groups set against such an outcome as appropriate. Thus Ujo argues that reform efforts to bring socio-political change can be affected by both relevance of such active efforts to improve material conditions and state of mind citizens used to evaluate adequacy of such effort and outcome.

From pure structural point of view Bogachi (2000) defines a developmental state as a state which places economic development as the top priority of government policy, and which is able to design effective instruments to promote such a goal. Some of these instruments include the “establishment of well-functioning formal institutions; weaving of formal and informal networks of collaboration among citizens and officials (Bagged, 2000: 398, cited in economic commission for Africa 2011:95).” Developmental sate is a state centered with building necessary institutions, norms and standards that can support its ideologies, structure and development process. Thus

developmental state is called as a state constituting the ‘software and the hardware’ of developmental issues (ibid p. 97; Weiss, 2010).

2.2. Origin and Evolution of Developmental State

Scholars argue that though the concept of developmental state emerged as response to overcome institutional failure; the process of building such state goes beyond those original motivations to address failure. They argue that the original reform pledge to transform institutional failure encounters several intermediate crises and involves variety of subsequent adjustment to resolve. Since adjustment rules to respond such crisis requires both spatial and temporal reality of contexts those can facilitate or hinder its process; the efforts to achieve its success depends on availability of certain combination of socio-cultural, political and institutional endowments and opportunities of support at domestic and international level. This is clear from how the success of Asian type autocratic developmental efforts supported by “*Asian values*” as well as international competition between west and east to win ideological war and why scholars identify necessity of democracy for the same end in Africa. Thus it is argued that emergence and success of developmental state involves enduring efforts to meet socio-cultural, political and institutional contexts at interplay until full transition (Doner, Ritchie and Slater: 329-31). These are also the reasons why “*Afro-barometer*” research team identifies social, cultural, political and institutional approaches to explain support for democracy among public in new democracy. Thus considering field experience at natural setting as reflection of regressive institutional legacies of hierarchy and secrecy; this study identifies idea of “*political culture*” and “*regime support*” in new democracies as theoretical lenses to capture explain how and why effects associated with socio-cultural, political and institutional legacies in history can influence support for democracy and satisfaction with its supply in a given political context.

2.3. Origin and Evolution of Political Culture Theory

The normative role of culture on politics goes back to ancient Greek scholars of Aristotle and Plato. They have suggested cultural origin of socio-political ethics and argued that culture shapes human psyches, and creates collective ties that underlie proper ethos or mores’; those sustain a political community of any form. However standard theoretical and methodological application of cultural values to examine political affairs of states is recent phenomenon,

introduced in 2nd half of 20th century by Almond and Verba in 1963. Then onwards theoretical and empirical relevance of political culture emerged as top approach to examine political science inquiry. Several scholars attracted to this theoretical wisdom to draw role of culture on politics though faced several counter arguments more especially, from rational choice theory from right and Neo-Marxists from left, until its reemergence in 1980's. Some of those top list political scientists defended theoretical, empirical and methodological validity of political culture theory after Almond and Verba include: A.Wildavsky Eckstein, Francis Fukuyama, Reisinger, Huntington, Inglehart and Christian Wetzels, Przeworski, 2000, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, 2001, 2006).

Thus in 1980's Wildavsky (1987), Eckstein (1988), and Almond (1990), provided further convictions in defending cultural perspective and led a reaction to the counter arguments and restored the balance in the field. This brought "the renaissance of culture;" claiming a series of historical developments that were not accounted by economic factors alone. Central to this arguments are about the belief that: one cannot explain unprecedented, rapid economic development in East Asia without understanding Confucianism, liberal values of western capitalism without protestant values and increasingly enduring impact of "post-materialist" values on electoral behavior of voters, in established democracies., Fukuyama, also argues importance of reconsidering socio-cultural values as religion, language and ethnicity that can matter political loyalty, integration and function, more especially in new democracies. Reisinger also added special insight in re-inspiring validity of original rationale of Almond's work - "civic culture" which introduced cultural dimensions to political study (Reisinger (1995, 331). This is clear from how he made ever comprehensive and powerful review, summarizing the validity by the question:

"How can scholars satisfactorily explain cross-national differences in politics without attending to the subjective orientations of the societies' members?"

Other, last but not least political scientist identified with cultural dimensions to political study, this article deeply attracted to review is, Samuel Huntington. He made a significant input to the revival of political culture research, especially after the fall of communism. In his concluding summary, Huntington hypothesizes that:

"In the post-Cold war world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political, or economic. They are cultural... the most important groupings of states are no longer the three blocks of the Cold War but rather the world's seven or eight major civilizations" (1996, 21). He defined civilization identities as culture and cultural identities "at the broadest level."

This all provided for the thesis of “Civic Culture” to refute irreversible canons used by linear” modernization theory scholars claim that human history and civilization as effect of value free evolution and excessive focus provided for economic [material] determinism.”

2.4. Theory of Regime Support

The concept regime support evolved as recent analytical approach to examine citizen’s support for democracy in nations new to the idea of democracy and the way it works. Though it is disputed that whether regime support implies to support for system of governance –regime as itself or incumbent government in power; scholars as Anderson assert that it is combined function of support for regime as general and for socio-political role made by government in authority (Anderson 1997). Thus it is support for normative values linked to regime as relevant system and instrumental achievement brought by government in power for its constituents though highly conditioned by macro cultural factors in given socio-political context. From empirical point of view the theory of regime support is used to measure demand for democracy and satisfaction with supply. The concept of theory of regime support has been evolved as special analytical tool to measure support for democracy; in recognition to challenging effects of institutional legacies on new efforts of 3rd world nations to build democracy. That means the idea of regime support emerged as subject matter of political science in 1960’s onwards with 3rd phase democratic wave and inconsideration to traditional institutional legacies those can matter reform efforts of 3rd world nations to achieve structural transformation.

This approach focuses on assessing public demand for democracy and perceived satisfaction with supply, in any given regime [democratic, semi-democratic and non-democratic]. This framework is used as methodological structure to explain the concept of support [legitimacy] in relation to demand for democracy and satisfaction with supply– both of two are conditioned by socio-cultural factors those can affect likely level of demand and satisfaction. For matter of empirical relevance, this article used findings from Afro-barometer research unit as primary source of reference. More specifically, 31st and 47th serious to working paper published by Robert Mattes and Michael Bratton, Keulder, Christiaan and Tania Wiese (2001 and 2005). They identify five empirical approaches to assess citizen’s attitude towards democracy in Africa: sociological, cultural, institutional, cognitive, and rational theory. They argue that African public opinion can best be understood through a lens of political learning, which combines elements of

cognitive awareness with rational evaluations of performance, conditioned also by national institutional legacies. Thus the study identified the following specific determinates, as empirical premise to help inform and structure assessing demand for democracy and satisfaction with supply in a given regime, more especially, in new democracies, appeared in 3rd wave democratic expansion as follows:

2.3.1. Social structure perspective

A highly influential approach to the study of the developing world assumes that people's values, preferences and behaviors are generally a function of their material, demographic or other life circumstances. Modernization premise defines the concept of social structure in relation to social mobility, which promotes adoption of progressive mass attitudes (Inkeles and Smith, 1974; Pye, 1990). This theory asserts that widespread *poverty* in Africa may provide a barrier to participate, not only because poor people have fewer stakes in society but also, given the imperative to satisfy basic survival needs; the poor may have little reason to worry about satisfying "higher order" needs like self-government, freedom and equality (Inglehart, 2000:3). Thus, the lack of a sizable *middle class* is widely cited as major stumbling block to sustainable democracy (Huntington, 1991).

As sociological approach, theory of social structure also emphasizes the demographic composition of society; as age, residence-location, and social or ethnic diversity; those either encourage or challenge democratic attitudes and democratic citizenship, by dividing society along demographic lines of identification (Wolfing and Rosenstein, 1980; Niemen and Barkan, 1987; and Seligson and Booth, 1996).

2.3.2. Cultural Values

As pioneered by Almond and Verba, a cultural value (theory of political culture) asserts that democracy proceeds from values that are culturally embedded and socially received (Almond and Verba, 1963 and 1980). Other political scholars as Inglehart, also adds that "the public's of different societies are characterized by durable cultural orientations that have major political and economic consequences" (1988:1). Applied to Africa, a cultural approach finds communitarian values produced by centuries of life in small villages under conditions of environmental scarcity, seasonal uncertainty, and group solidarity (Horowitz, 1991:2). These values might generate at least three implications for democracy in Africa. *First*, African cultures have been said to emphasize the communal good over individual destiny, leading

people to think and act as passive, deferential and dependent clients of external forces rather than as active agents with some degree of control over their own lives or the wider polity. Thus, Africans may lack a sense of “*individual responsibility*” for personal well-being or risk tolerance that is necessary for democratic citizenship (Chazan, 1993; Etounga-Manguelle, 2000:21-45). *Second*, because of social diversity; many analysts have concluded that Africa has insufficient levels of national identity. Democracy presumes at least some prior agreement on the identity of the political community that is to govern itself (Rustow, 1970 and 1990; Gellner, 1983; and Linz and Stepan, 1996). Social identities have been portrayed as largely primordial and relatively resistant to modernization attempts to construct new overarching identities (Lijphart, 1977; Connor, 1990; Horowitz, 1991). They asserts that low levels of national identity, usual to social diversity; thus diverge efforts of young democracies the necessary “political integration,” turning every element of political contestation into a zero-sum, group-based conflict, and threatening the very stability of the polity. *Third*, people who retain traditional identities (based on culture, language, ethnicity or hometown) rather than modern identities (such as class or occupation) may develop antipathies to “others” and be less likely to accept a democracy that necessarily includes competing groups (Gibson and Gouws, 2000). Such a culture may also limit the radius of interpersonal trust in fellow citizens to the immediate scope of the village, neighborhood or clan, thus reducing the development of social capital (Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995) as well as political cooperation and participation (Inglehart, 1988, 1990).

More recent and advanced study by scholars as Acemoglu and Robinson furthers such powerful effect of cultural values on democracy and economic development. They found that both economic development and democracy can be attributed to “fixed national effects,” which reflect a society’s entire historical, institutional and cultural heritage. Based on this evidence they indicate that a given society’s institutional and cultural heritage is remarkably enduring (Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Wetzels, 2005; Przeworski et al. 2000; Acemoglu and Robinson’s 2000, 2001, 2006; cf. Robinson, 2006). More especially Acemoglu and Robinson’s conclude that the basic democratic values as self expression and mutual respect as function of experience with democracy and evolve through slow but continuous processes, while democracy often emerges suddenly after long periods of institutional stagnation. Consequently, it is the “*level of self-expression*” values at the time of the break-through, not recent changes in

these levels, which determines the magnitude of subsequent changes toward democracy. Thus they argue that certain modernization-linked mass attitudes are stable attributes of given societies and that has strong explanatory power to examine public attitude towards a given regime and to identify its socio-political relevance for constituents.

From pure theoretical perspective political culture premise states that; a society's mass values have the stronger causal effect on its subsequent role in the development and maintenance (or failure) of democracy. This theory postulates that the viability of a democratic regime is affected powerfully by attitudes such as beliefs in one's ability to influence political decisions, feelings of positive affect for the political system, and the belief that other citizens are basically trustworthy, usually expressed as '*civic virtues*' that enable democratic regimes to function effectively. More over it argues that a democratic system will become stable only if people have internalized democratic norms and practice them in their daily relationships. In other sense political culture implies to broad pattern of values and attitudes that individuals and societies hold toward political objects." These political objects include institutions, such as the executive, legislature, bureaucracy, judiciary, political parties, pressure groups, and also the individual's view of him-or herself as a political actor, and in relation to others, Almond, Brava and L. Pye 1963, 1980 and 1990, R. Ignart 1988 and 2008, Hamilton, 1976). Fuchs (2002) also identifies different objects and dimensions of political attitudes such as the system as a whole, the output-structures or the own political role. Based on Easton's model of diffuse and specific support, he developed a multilevel model of democratic support (2002: 35). The hierarchically arranged elements of this model are:

"The normative and cultural level (idea of democracy), the structural level (structure of the implemented democracy) and the performance level (performance of the implemented democracy)" (Fuchs 2002:35)

In other academic political science study, scholars as (Van de Walle 2001:12) explain institutional virtues of citizens towards a given regime in relation to "*trust*," civic members express towards regime's socio-political function and government in authority. He indicates that general political-cultural identities or variables have the strongest overall effect on variation in people's trust on regime as general and government in particular. Referring the fact from the strong effect of unqualified identification of citizens with democracy in western institutional tradition; he asserts that passive political integration and approval may be as important for trust as more specific opinions about particular aspects of public-sector values,

organizations and performance. David Easton (1975) also argues that cultural origin of factors as “trust” and that variation in people’s trust in government institutions can be traced to a somewhat larger degree to issues affecting “*diffuse support*” for the political system (such as experience with democracy or autocracy) than to factors affecting *specific support* for a given public-sector reform.

2.3.3. Institutional perspective

This theory links attitudes towards democracy as a consequence of the organizing principles of formal and informal institutions. Institutional-ists claim, mass attitudes and behaviors are ruled by incentives embedded in forms of state (March and Olsen, 1984; Hall and Taylor, 1996). Horowitz, and Reynolds, specifies the case and claims that; it is possible to infer impact of institutional legacies without fully accepting an institutional position by acknowledging a person’s organized affiliations and behaviors as most likely issue that to influence his or her attitudes, more especially in Africa. “*Partisan identification*”, especially with the *winning party*, can lead to greater satisfaction with democracy (Horowitz, 1991:2, Anderson and Guillory, 1997). Moreover participation in formal procedures like voting, working for parties or candidates, attending community meetings, joining with others to raise issues or contacting elected leaders can themselves have an educative effect. There is growing evidence that the very act of voting increases a person’s interest in politics and sense of political efficacy (Finkel, 2000) and can build support for democracy (Blair, 2000; Bratton, et al., 1999).

The issue is more special in Africa inspired with novel drives to build such institutions as response to overcome institutional failure and national consequences associated with such stagnations. Beyond such strategic motives that can increase levels of demand and supply of democracy among people in Africa who have partaken on such rituals of institution building; majoritarian nature of most electoral arrangements in sub-Saharan Africa also inspires “*winner take all*” disposition that increases differences in democratic attitudes due to political status as “winners, “losers or neutrals.” But given the fact that Africa lacks strong institutional tradition, the issues of political attitude appear as more of dominant impacts associated with informal socio-cultural values society on behavioral position of citizens than effects associated with formal institutional tradition.

From academic point of view Peter Evans identifies issues those can matter developmental regimes. In his (1992) article “*embedded autonomy*”; he stresses why and how the process of

building developmental institution are challenging, more especially in Africa. Evans claims two basic challenges to promote embedded-ness of bureaucracy to act as core state apparatus and as special institutional wing to developmental system in Africa, as in Asia: First lack of socio-cultural traditions conducive to democracy at domestic level and lack of supportive external conditions to help efforts of states to build such bureaucracy. Second he claims that most sources to establish such exceptional bureaucracy with required developmental capacities and desires entail the question whether we can find such elements from institutional or historical past of a given society (Evans 1995: 48; 1992: 164). Driving the assertions from his theoretical and empirical observation that conditions to sustain exceptional bureaucracy are ever challenging in Africa that: *First* rarity of Asian variety of archetypical developmental bureaucracies in Africa (Evans 1995: 39). *Second*, even in the most successful cases, endowed with effective embedded autonomy; the state never fully managed to escape the dangers of particularistic interests. *Third* he observes that the developmental state was constructed under extremely challenging conditions of institutional restructuring internal to any such structural adjustments in the transitional process of change (Evans 1992: 164). *Fourth*, he claims that the developmental state is not static and that it tends to progressively transform itself into “its own gravedigger” that at certain point of developmental progress, its friends become either foes or leaves for alternative source of reliance brought with deliberate state efforts to sustain broad based and rapid economic growth (Evans, 1992: 165).

2.3.4. Cognitive Awareness

Though the impact of cognitive awareness on demand for democracy and supply perception of any ordinary peoples in general and population in case particular; found to be conditioned by other socio-cultural factors; democracy works best when “the people” are well educated to sustain such end. Scholars argue that the quality of citizenship improves as citizens learn to identify their leaders, understand the procedures of the political system, and become exposed to contemporary policy debates. According to Dalton and Milner education promotes “cognitive mobilization” and “civic literacy” which in turn encourages levels of interest and knowledge about politics and democracy –or what they call cognitive awareness (Dalton, 1988, Milner, 2002). Harber argues some of such conditioning factors those can affect progressive impact associated with literacy on demand for and supply of democracy, more especially in Africa. He identifies that demand for democracy and its supply in Africa can be affected by uneven nature

of access to formal education and due to official school systems are organized along the elitist lines with authoritarian features (Harber, 1997). He adds that even if, such literacy involves universal access and liberal patterns the quality of schooling possibly affected by poverty and economic crisis. Thus impact of formal education on demand for and supply of democracy in Africa seems to either fragmented or operate on instruction models of rote learning with little emphasis on practical skills or independent thought.

Thus researchers regarding literacy on demand for democracy and satisfaction with supply, identifies other factors those can either encourage or discourage such demand and satisfaction; with or without such end in African context. They assert that demand for democracy and satisfaction with its supply in Africa will be either of factors as: ever growing role of mass media, interactive forums and process of candidate nominations, the working of electoral systems or simple familiarity with the identity of incumbent leaders, which can create a point of contact with the political system and foster closer attention to decision making processes. Accordingly, as general inference and as for the purpose of review in case, *cognitive engagement* implies to and can be possible for those who interested in local or national public affairs and active discussion of political events and policy issues with family, friends, and neighbors.

Furthermore study identifies that; cognitive awareness at advanced stage can highly condition satisfaction with democracy even in a most liberal democracy with maximum functional efficiency. Intellectuals found that ever high level of ideal demand for democracy and low level of satisfaction with its achievements, as effect associated with the character of what they call “*critical citizens*”. This group of citizens emerges with modern education, more especially among those with advanced educational attainment and become ever dissatisfied with what democracy performs in a given regime. Though they are essential to question government failure in advanced democracies; for new democracies such citizens pose challenges on government loaded with adjustment costs paid to transform modern reform efforts. According to pipe Norris (1999), such “critical citizens” not only becomes distrustful towards political institutions and its actors, but also set increasingly higher standards of regime performance while according a great value to democracy. That means studies found that; higher levels of education, lead citizens to be not only more critical but also more dissatisfied with democratic

performance and the way democracy works, except character commitment with ideal principles, democracy embodies as regime.

2.3.5. Instrumental motivations

Though citizens use overlapping roots of motivations in evaluating regime performance; this theory assumes that people demand democracy and evaluate its supply from these pragmatic positions based on the actual performance of democratic institutions and its central actors. That means; this theory assess evaluative origin of citizens towards regime performance by embedding normative criteria public can use to evaluate performance and instrumental criteria used to measure direct material achievement. Thus cultural theory argues that democracy works because people possess democratic norms and a cognitive theory emphasizes political information, rational [instrumental] theory stresses that people develop attachments to democracy because democracy works (Evans and Whitefield, 1995: 489).

The principle of rational choice states that individual behavior is purposive and considered, rather than random or determined by larger social forces. People compare the costs and benefits associated with different regimes and align themselves with arrangements that best serve their individual and collective interests. If citizens feel that elected governments fulfill campaign promises of prosperity, support will increase, not only for the government of the day, but also for democracy. If, however, they suffer inflation or unemployment, support will decrease. In Elster's (1993: 268) blunt words, "democracy will be undermined if it cannot deliver goods in the economic sphere." Such predictions resonate well with prevailing perspectives on African politics as the "politics of the belly" (Bayart, 1993). In short the following respective scholars summarizes the rational perspective claiming that; *"people's short-term economic evaluations" including their present, past, and future estimations of micro- and macro-economic trends* ((Przeworski, et al., 1995, Kitschelt, 1992; Dalton, 1994; Anderson, 1995; Mattes and Christie, 1997; and Norris, 1999), *government economic performance, and perceptions of the equity of economic adjustment*; (Dalton, 1994; Anderson, 1995); as issues that matter support for democracy and satisfaction with its achievements in a given system of governance, more especially in new democracies.

Thus they claim that, rational choice approach would seem little prospects for Africa's young democracies given the continent's initial economic conditions. Elected leaders have inherited huge public debts and negative economic growth rates as a result of macroeconomic

mismanagement by previous governments. Accordingly Dalton (1994) argues that the leader's ability to deliver immediate income and welfare benefits is limited by the necessity of taking measures of economic structural adjustment to bring desired transformation. Moreover, dominant-party systems in most African democracies make it very difficult for most voters to "throw the bums out." Thus he questions that how long people will remain patient with a political regime that they see as incapable of improving their conditions in the very near future (Dalton, 1994:15)

In general, there is broad agreement that levels of democratic support depend to a significant extent on the economic and political performance of the newly established regimes. As citizens perceive that regimes deliver positive economic outputs and institute increased democratic freedoms, successful representation of individual or group preferences and reduced corruption; the level of public support for regime, its institutions and actors increases dramatically. Thus the conclusion was that while economic performance was important in explaining support, political performance or political factors seemed to matter more than economic factors. Thus instrumentalists identified relative and shifting role of both material and non material preconditions, to sustain support for democracy and its consolidation across time serious as effect of a long experience. In summary, based on index wise empirical perspective to organize review, scholars assess demand for and supply of democracy; by using "five" core indexes used to explain support for democracy. They assert that support for democracy as function of:

"Outright rejection of non-democratic alternatives and hence by the normative belief that democracy is best; electoral legitimacy for the incumbents; the performance of key actors in the system; the way citizens identify themselves in the relations of power; and trust citizens show toward key actors" (Collected from 2003 "Afro-barometer" survey in Namibia by Christian Keulder and Tania Wiese)

They use several items for these core indexes constructed as explanatory variables or factors. However for the last four explanations scholars as (M. Bratton and R. Mattes, 2001:3) attach some degree of conditionality as response to the fact that these indexes are more and more dependent on contexts than has normative foundations. This is due to these all variables place an emphasis on the personal agency or actors in charge:

"Who they are, how they were appointed, how they perform and how much they are trusted and why".

None of these require a normative commitment to democracy as itself. That is, none of the other variables, i.e. "legitimacy," "performance of political actors," "being a supporter of the

ruling party [political status],” or “trusts in government,” has a statistically significant influence on support for democracy. It seems to indicate that commitment to democracy is, to a greater extent, based on a rejection of non-democratic rule, and hence, a normative commitment rather than a product of the workings of the political system.

2.3.6. Historical Perspective

According to this perspective, democracy is about the effect of long experience, referring century long process democratization required for Western countries to establish, Sartori (1987a; 1987b) and Austin (1990). Austin notes that the “process of democratization was long, over a period of slow enfranchisement, at a time of increasing prosperity” (p.14). Sartori points out that democracy has evolved to its present stage over a period of 2,000 years through a process of trial and error that incorporated historical learning of concepts such as power, liberty and equality. Though 2,000 years is a long time to wait; democracy has real prospect to emerge in short time horizon, that prior to one hundred and fifty years ago no country had a political democracy as measured by current standards. This is clear from the fact that most European countries became democratic only in 19th century. This theory further asserts that beyond this evolutionary nature of democracy, evolved as effect of long period of time; it requires historical tradition compatible to values of democracy. The implication is that it is not easy to establish and sustain a democratic political system in many Third World countries that lack the political culture and historical experience to nurture democratic institutions. Thus they indicate that the failures of or setbacks to democratization can be explained, at least in part, by the “*cultural or historical incompatibility*” hypothesis. But it is that very lack of democratic culture and experience that makes the “can learn” theory of democracy-claiming pro-active assistance to nourish idea of democracy as below.

2.3.7. Theory of Learning Democracy

Though recent, this theory views democracy as something that can be taught or learnt. This theory views, democratization as not a gradual evolution but a process that lays the foundation and creates a demand [commitment] for democracy. This premise is developed by Kusterer (1992) as the “*can do*” school. Diamond (1990) also asserts similar point of view claiming that, after initial introduction of democracy in a given political system; the growth, sustainability and consolidation of democracy depend on a complex set of factors or lessons to learn:

“regime legitimacy and performance, political leadership, social and economic structures and effects it entail, associational life, nature of state-society relationship, political institutions (political parties, party systems, constitutional[support] roots or structures), ethnic relations, intra-country regional relations, the military and external factors” (Diamond et al 1990a:9).

He argues that the relative importance of these will depend on the country and situation. The essay in Diamond and Plattner (1993a) further illustrates this point. For example, Diamond, Linz and Lijphart argue for institutions and mechanisms that would mitigate conflicts and cleavages and build consensus. Lipset (1994) stresses two of such factors for democratic transition among five broad factors identified by Diamond and claims that economic conditions and political culture as most critical variables than institutional structure to build democracy. He particularly stresses the importance of “effective government”. This means the new democratic government must be able to deliver economic and political goods or services. He stresses that those countries recently entered the democratic path; there are parallel economic reform programs and which normally requires long time for these reforms to yield results that benefit the mass of people. This is because initial adjustment efforts to economic restructuring leads to more unemployment and a cut in living standards. Such results do not inspire public confidence in democracy. In Africa the process has produced mixed results with relative successes and failures.

Though such differing perspectives on transition to democracy by different scholars, the “*can do*” school stresses that democracy can be built through the help of wise leadership, strategic and intelligent institution building.

2.5. Conceptual framework to specify purpose of study

Scholars describe conceptual framework for research as a system of concepts, assumptions, expectations, beliefs, and theories that supports and informs your research design (Miles and Hagerman, 1994). According to Miles and Huberman (1994) conceptual framework implies a visual or written product, one that “explains, either graphically or in narrative form, the main things to be studied—the key factors, concepts, or variables—and the presumed relationships among them”. Though most scholars assert that the conceptual framework to social research varies from case to case, issue specific and depends on aim of topic in question; the case developed conceptual frame to the article based on Miles and Huberman’s (1994) notes in framing ideal purpose of study. They asserts that conceptual frame serve as abstract picture to:

- (a) identify those who will and will not be included in the study;
- (b) describing what

relationships may be present based on logic, theory and/or experience; and (c) provide the researcher with the opportunity to meet purposive constructs into intellectual “bins of wisdom” (Miles and Huberman 1994:18).

Informed by such methodological reasons and observed case at ground, the thesis examined attitudinal position of population in the case towards socio-political function of developmental democracy. The purpose of review is to understand whether and to what extent regressive cultural values, can affect demand for democracy and satisfaction with developmental supply. In other words, the study is an empirical assessment on attitudinal position of instructors in Bonga college of Teachers Education towards developmental regime of Ethiopia. Thus the study is derived by immediate empirical and theoretical observations to examine whether, to what extent and how macro legacies of system level cultural factors; can find itself, on micro behavior and attitude of population in case. That means the study concerns to identify level of support for democracy and satisfaction with developmental performance in recognition to regressive institutional legacies of hierarchy and secrecy as issues that can affect necessary civic duty to build democracy and help efforts to socio-cultural transformation.


The issue has both theoretical reasons and empirical grounds that transitional process involves struggle between two opposing macro forces: cultural forces those drag back towards statuesque and reform efforts that push towards structural transformation and relative crisis in between. In other words it implies that despite the fact that developmental intervention to bring socio-political transformation is defined in global terms; efforts to achieve such change have socio-cultural or domestic terms of issues that can impede its ultimate success. Thus applied to the idea in question; the problem implies that nations like Ethiopia with major reform efforts in transition, has burdens to accommodate and sustain its initial motivation and potential outcome with emerging interests and the root where it surfaced.

The investigator claims the issue as problem from Levin’s (2008:1) assertion that the issue matters and identified as cause responsible for prolonged institutional stagnation, lost opportunities and averting popular movements for change across entire 20th century. The problem matters not only why developmental approach adopted as direct response to resolve, but also cultural effects are enduring and autonomous from such efforts to address. Thus the case aims to identify remaining reflection of regressive institutional memories of feudal and military legacies of hierarchy, secrecy and complex socio-political effects tied with such institutional

culture at agency level. As observed fact and theoretical assertion, such legacies provided self serving motives among most individuals and groups in public service as general and sense of partisanship, self-defense, corrupt mentality, and suspicion in particular. From transitional process perspective, Ethiopia is a country in a rapid process of growth though far from ensuring strong middle class required to link gap between usual class structures and to transform such regressive institutional residues towards socio-political integration & democratic structural change.

Thus considering system level institutional traditions unfavorable to idea of democracy and burdens usual to transitional process; the study assesses such factors to understand their effects on demand for democracy and satisfaction with developmental supply. That means the aim of article is to infer demand for democracy and satisfaction with developmental outcome [if any] and why as such that its adoption to break *path dependence* at international and national level. From domestic point of view breaking path dependency implies to transforming socio-cultural and political conditions by institutional restructuring and development.

Graphically the concept appears as:



CHAPTER THREE: DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

3.1. Description of the Study Area

Bonga College of teacher education established in 2000 as teachers training college before teachers Education College in 2007. It is one of the five colleges in southern nation's nationalities and people's regional state. The college identified the name "Bonga" from original place where Kafecho people live. It is also common name for capital city of Kaffa Zone – Bonga. The college surrounds at western corner around five kilometers from the center of city. As one of thirteen zones in southern nation's nationalities and people's regional state "Kaffa" Zone borders; Benchmaji Zone in west, South Omo at south, Konta special woreda at south east and Jimma zone from Oromia region in east and north east. Bonga city is located at 450 KMs from Addis Ababa on the main road of Jimma – Mizan. Bonga is one of a major commercial center during long distance trade in medieval era. The area is also a palace where Coffee is originated and national coffee museum built in recognition to such historical importance.

3.2. Approach to the Study Design

Yin (2002) defines case based "qualitative research design;" as "the logical sequence that connects the empirical data to a study's initial propositions, questions and, ultimately, to its conclusions" (Yin, 2002:20). Concerning nature of design; Yin identifies four types of design: "single holistic, single embedded, multiple holistic and multiple embedded designs" and five interdependent components used to help guide study process: "a study's questions; its propositions; its unit(s) of analysis; the logic linking the data to the propositions; and the criteria for interpreting the findings (Yin, 2002:21). He asserts that holistic designs require one unit of analysis, whereas embedded designs require multiple units of analysis. Concerning five design components he stresses fourth and fifth components: *the model or logic linking the data to the propositions; and the criteria for interpreting the findings*" as their exceptional relevance to help complex process of structuring data collection and analysis process in case methods. This is because of the fact that there is no well developed design rules to structure and guide case study process unless creative construction of components, more especially propositions and criteria's to interpret findings; in order that the inquiry has a solid foundation for the analytic operations (Yin, 2002, p. 26). Given importance of propositions to guide qualitative case studies; Yin argues that researchers should have to conduct prior review of relevant literature and include theoretical hint before conducting data collection. Furthermore he identifies four rules to

measure the quality of the design and its consequent role to sustain reliability of the problem involving the questions that whether the design meets: “*construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability*” (Yin, 2002:27).

Thus considering all above rules accordingly; this particular study employed holistic embed design to assess perception of individuals towards developmental democracy with several variables of interests. The study is composed of five interdependent components used to help study process: “*a study’s questions; its propositions; its unit(s) of analysis; the logic linking the data to the propositions; and the criteria for interpreting the findings*”. Regarding role of theoretical lenses to guide study process and its outcome; the study employed empirical and theoretical propositions as rule to help verify actual experience at field settings. *Empirically* the study claims observed state of affairs at field setting as reflection of institutional legacies and alleges as factors those can matter current efforts to socio-cultural transformation. *Theoretically* the study identifies political culture premise that long established institutional values involve enduring effect on socio-political orientation of citizens regardless of relevance of reform outcome. To ensure quality of the design and adequacy of outcome; the review employed four design rules identified: standard tools used to promote *construct validity*, purposive and observed motives behind issue in study to promote *internal validity*, informed use of theoretical propositions to sustain *external validity and reliability*.

Regarding general issues of paradigms, beliefs or world views behind most qualitative study, researchers & propositions; the investigator purposely interested to adopt “*social constructionist*” ontology, as appropriate paradigm to embed the questions. That means as case with observed empirical and theoretical motivations and normative nature of cultural values; the study considers constructivist approach as framework to help define the event, respond how and why such observed experiences are actual virtues, accepted by society and has cultural roots. This is the reason why scholars as Stake (1995:3) identifies four defining characteristics to be concerned in designing any qualitative approaches to research. He argues that any qualitative approaches to research design should have to be grounded on; “*holistic, empirical, interpretive and emphatic*” considerations. *Holistic* means that researchers should consider the interrelationship between the phenomenon and context, where such observed event or behavior surface. *Empirical* means that researchers base the study on their observations in the field. *Interpretive* means that researchers rest upon their intuition and notice the problem as part of

his/her experience or interaction and grounds behind drive to examine the issue as trouble that matter. Lastly, *empathic* means; that researchers reflect the explicit experiences of the subjects in an *empathic* perspective (p. 3).

According to Creswell (2014) the goal of the research based on constructivist word view relies on as much as possible on the participants' views of the situation being studied. The questions become broad and general so that the participants can construct the meaning of a situation, typically forged in discussions or interactions with other persons. The more open-ended the questioning, the better the researcher observes or listens carefully to what people say or do in their life settings. Often these subjective meanings are negotiated socially and historically. They are not simply imprinted on individuals but are formed through interaction with others (hence social constructivism) and through historical and cultural norms that operate in individuals' lives. Thus constructivist researchers often address the processes of interaction among individuals. They also focus on the specific contexts in which people live and work in order to understand the historical and cultural settings of the participants. Researchers recognize that their own backgrounds shape their interpretation and they position themselves in the research to acknowledge how their interpretation flows from their personal, cultural, and historical experiences. The researcher's intent is to make sense of or interpret the meanings others have about the world (Creswell 2014, p37). These are the notions why the researcher considers observed experience at natural setting as problem.

In general Qualitative research scholars support a constructivist or interpretive paradigm and “contend that multiple-constructed realities flourish, that time-and context-free generalizations are neither desirable nor possible, that research is value-bound, that it is impossible to differentiate fully causes and effects, that logic flows from specific to general or context to theory and that knower and known cannot be separated because the subjective knower is the only source of reality” (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 14). They claims that despite lack of discrete list of mixed methods design options; professional plan by researchers to develop a design that answers their own research questions within the constraints and boundaries of the study context are, important considerations to be taken in mixed approach (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie 2004: 20).

3.3. Research methodology

The study adopted mixed approach with aims to conduct descriptive survey through collecting both qualitative and quantitative information for analysis. The descriptive assessment method was preferred because it ensures complete description of the situation, making sure that there was minimum bias in the collection of data and finding out the what, where and how of a phenomenon (Kothari, 2008). In a literal term, Creswell adds that, in mixed method, as in case, research methodology implies to combined analysis of qualitative and quantitative techniques, methods, approaches, instruments and concepts in a single study (2004:226). Moreover Mixed research method emerged as most important approach since 1990's onward with agreed end of "paradigm war" among methodological scholars for "paradigm relativism" that –"the use of whatever theoretical and methodological approach (that) works for the particular research problem under study" (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2008, p. 9). Moreover Chen (1997) argues that where the purpose of the research is made clear and is theory-driven (i.e. presented through a logical chain of evidence); then that substantive focus becomes a super ordinate goal which limits tensions of divergence in mixing of methods (Chen, 1997).

For theoretical part the article used Kumar (2005:37) notions regarding the idea of literature review as: "to provide a theoretical background to ones study and to contextualize the findings in relation to the existing body of knowledge in addition to refining the methodology". To ascertain such purpose, the study employed *three* different but interdependent instruments, as participant observation, close ended; open ended as well as formal and informal focus group conversation, to promote comparing, contrasting and integrating aim, data and outcome from different theoretical and empirical sources and tools.

3.2.1 Method of data collection

Since methodology is about general tactic and involves specific methods or strategies in detail; for the purpose and in consideration to necessary tools conducive to help data collection process, the case purposively employed *three* different but interdependent instruments: *participant observation, close and open ended questionnaires as well as formal and informal group conversation*". That means the review used "field notes" compiled from participant observation, informant specific survey questioners [both close and open ended] and informal conversation. Thus the study used both primary and secondary [theoretical] sources of information to help process of data collection.

Theoretical and empirical issues regarding reason and purpose behind each tools used to collect data; the review employed “*observation*” as both underlying approach to guide review and develop other tools to collect data. Thus the review used “*participant observation*” as both methodology and method [as instrument as itself] and to help designing other instruments for data collection process. That means the case inspired by observed state of affairs as issue of concern to make professional review and instrument to help collection of required theoretical and empirical data. In other words the review is derived by what observed as case in Bonga College of teacher’s education and field notes compiled in consideration to examine the issue as problem that deserve professional review. The review provided special focus for participant observation, not only for its initial function to identify issue in question and help data collection process but also its methodological assertion that observation is fundamental method to examine and understand issues related with social or behavioral discipline in given natural settings. That means observation as one of research method; has special function to collect and compile information related with verbal and none verbal expression of feelings; pattern, meaning and implications tied with such expressions; the whys, how’s, for whom and with whom of such feelings and impacts associated with it on social and interpersonal interaction [Bernard 1994, p142-3]

To help the review with other qualitative tools to collect information related with question in case; the investigator made concerned use of “*informal conversation*” as means to implore supportive themes with potential information to increase depth of analysis, understanding and relevance of desired end. The case adopted “informal conversation” as convenient means to data collection because the data collected from formal focus group discussion with concerned key informants lacked information required for case in question. That means the reflective information collected from those key informants focused by case emerged as either too negative or too positive. In other words those who identify themselves with the regime and government in authority perceive that the regime promotes socio-political goods and services as well as ensures democratic rights. On other hand those who not identify themselves with the regime and government in authority perceive the regime as ever poor and not only least committed to ensure democratic rights for citizens but also lack of possible socio-political goods and services as outcome. Moreover as matter of research ethics and as response to situation on ground; the researcher identified the issue as “*politically sensitive*” and avoided audio recording. In

recognition to such considerations methodological scholars assert “*informal conversation*” as appropriate if the issue in question is involves provocative socio-political sentiments with clashing interests and can be examined through other complimentary qualitative methods (Stake 1995). Thus to consolidate information collected from *informal conversation*, the review developed composite open ended questioners to explore transcriptional data. The reflection for open-ended questioners are appeared most basic to sort information obtained from other two qualitative methods

To help link gaps associated with above two qualitative tools, the review employed quantitative tools to collect issues specific numerical data. Quantitative codes are developed in consideration to help standard analysis and thus constructed as interval form except one continuous independent, control or covariate with dummy codes [approve Vs disapprove] to model, group and test effects associated with its values on criterion variables.

Thus the review focused on related books, journals and working papers regarding origin and function of traditional institutional values and effect associated with such long established institutional legacies on individual or group behaviors in relation to new policy reform objects

3.2.2. Data sources

The study collected evidence from both primary and secondary sources. The researcher obtained primary data from teaching staffs, stream officers and primary school teachers. The study identified idea of regime support and political culture theory as respective empirical and theoretical sources to help guide the study process. Thus the review focused on related books, journals and working papers regarding origin and function of traditional institutional values and effect associated with such long established institutional legacies on individual or group behaviors in relation to new policy reform objects.

3.2.3. Data collection strategy

The study adopted *concurrent* data collection approach argued to gather required empirical and theoretical information at a time. That means the study adopted simultaneous collection and analysis of both quantitative and qualitative data’s. Though the case adopted qualitative approaches to analysis; equal priority has been given to each data based on extent of convergence, which is evolved as matter of design and fine fortune. Thus the study followed QUAL+ quant “*notation*” as frame to structure data or index wise approaches in defining

instruments to promote integration of data from respective codes. Close ended codes are constructed to capture case specific numerical data's and qualitative codes are constructed to implore written and verbal themes based on conceptual articulation to solicit convergent themes to study as general and indexes respective to codes in particular.

The case used theory as an inductive and deductive (as informed source to construct questions and guide to review other relevant theories), to construct and respond questions in case. The article followed such strategy that unique to other research designs in social science; in mixed method approach, it is possible to use theory as explicit frame to guide both qualitative themes and quantitative codes. Thanks to "Afro-barometer" research unit, the study employed standard themes and more than two sub indexes to help code, collect, contextualize and categorize data for analysis.

3.2.4. Data type and measurement scale

As described above, the case used quantitative data generated from close ended questionnaires. For such indexes, respondents in case, are asked to rate each item on a "Likert" form of scale with 1-5 value levels and select one of values among more than two value multiple choose and dichotomous responses with grouping or categorical values. The review used Field notes from participant observation and reflections to open ended questionnaires, informal discussion as tools to implore extensive qualitative data.

3.4. Sampling Technique

The study used purposive sampling, informed by participant observation with special focus to population observed in site. For the purpose of triangulation and to keep validity of findings, the study sorted population in sample in to academic and administrative staffs. Among this categories, the study purposefully focused [5] administrative staffs among eight as *key informant* to case and ten [10] among 56 academic members to college, who provided voluntary cooperation to share their understanding for questions in review. Since the observation is dependent; the study purposively expanded sampling frame to make population to population and population to sample comparison as means to promote triangulation, relevance and validity of answers in question. That means beyond purposive focus of review, considering Bonga College of teacher education as basic institution for analysis; the study included 45 more sample

units from 4th year civic focus summer students to make population to population and population to sample comparison.

This additional sample has been selected based on purposive concerns that all [350] trainers are social and language stream learners for three years, before they were given administrative order to decide on professional specialization as: “civic focus, English focus, Amharic focus and geography focus in this year.” That means given “*cognitive awareness*” or required interest and knowledge about democracy matters citizens commitment for such end and satisfaction with its socio-political function; the inclusion of civic focus learner’s with necessary understanding on academic issues of state, society, government, democracy and human rights..., implies extent of purposive considerations regarding this extra sample selection. The rationale to include such additional sample from primary school teachers is to help triangulate and verify implications drawn from instructors identified as main sample unit, help respond proposed questions in design.

3.4.1 Study Population

The study included all active (81) staff members (higher education employees) in (*Bonga college of teachers education*) as primary sample unit to explain the issue in question. But some instructors are not interested to cooperate for review and share their understandings for the question under case and some others left the college as promotion to undertake graduate study as well as incomplete responses in close ended interview; the case is limited to information provided by sixty one instructors. In addition to such purposive units in sample; the review included 61 more samples from 4th year *civic focus* summer students to promote methodological triangulation as means to verify relevance of observed problem with responses or validity of observation in responding desired questions of interest. The study also conducted focus group discussion with students below five year teaching experience. Thus the sample in case compliment the methodological assertion that “*case selection*” must be determined by the research purpose, questions, propositions empirical and theoretical context; as well as accessibility (whether the data needed can be collected from the case individual or organization) and required resources at hand (Stake 1994).

3.4.2. Sample Size

Though methodological scholars prescribe differing comments regarding “*sample size*”; the assertions are complimentary to one another and seems different expression for similar

implication. This is clear from what the following scholars, purposely selected to help inform determining issues of sample size, in any qualitative study. For Maxwell [2013], sample size in case based specific investigation is about more of information richness than representative opinion. For Mariam (2009); sample size for qualitative study; more specially, for case study, depends on research question, why or how of data collected, analyzed and verified than how much of sample size (p, 80). As well Morse (1994) adds that ' it is possible to examine case based definite review by using average of *six participants*, if the issue is to understand essence of certain empirical experience. Thus as response to both methodological assertion that desires to keep quality of observation more important than rules to justify adequacy of sample size and time limits; the study considered concept of "political culture" and instructors in Bonga college of teachers education as respective theoretical and empirical boundary to explain the case. In other words the study included all instructors in the college as empirical source to data and theory of regime support in new democracies as theoretical boundary to demarcate the scope of the review in question.

Informed by such methodological reasoning; the case included those staff members, the researcher observed as part of staff community in the college, as main sample unit to collect empirical data and to explain the review in question. To verify reliability of such observed problem in site, the researcher included 45 additional samples from summer students with five and more year teaching experience in primary schools as cluster units compare findings. Thus the review considers divergence of findings among these two sample unit to validate results from main sample unit in an observation.

Regarding to theoretical sources to help appropriate review with purposive and clear boundary; the article explained the case from five complimentary scholastic perspectives. That means the critique used premise of "political culture"; as main theoretical framework and other sub perspectives, as; - idea of social structure, institutional tradition, historical lessons, cognitive awareness and rational motivations those determine meaning, relevance and outcome of a given regime to its origin and for its constituents. These theoretical perspectives are found as vital to understand origin, effect and function of individual and group political orientations in a given political system, more especially new democracies in transition. To such end the study used integrative review approach as newly focused methodological instrument to promote complete and cross sectional search on the topic of related theoretical sources for mixed research

technique. Thus the study identified relevant empirical and theoretical frames from related books, articles and journals to develop instruments to review and explain reflections to problem in question, more importantly from Afro-barometer.

3.4.3. Sampling frame

As discussed above in 3.4.1 and in 3.4.2; those respective sampling strategy and sample sizes are not without methodological rules to justify such sample units and their size. Inconsideration to studies with derives to examine essence of experiences at field settings and to keep quality of such purposive observation on small sample unit without violating standard rules used to determine sample size; scholars as Harsh Suri (2011) identify the following sampling frames as strategies to ensure case validity. In his 2011 purposive sampling synthesis Suri compiles “*sixteen*” overlapping sampling frame developed by other methodologists to help qualitative study. Though he identifies such numerous sampling frames to guide purposive motives behind case based qualitative sampling; this particular study purposefully employed five complimentary tactics among other strategies as rules to justify adequacy of sample size to generalize outcome as:

1. **Maximum Variation or Heterogeneity Sampling** - A maximum variation sampling frame is constructed by identifying key dimensions of variations and then finding cases that vary from each other as much as possible as rules to report adequacy of sample size and evidence from such unit. This sampling yields: ‘(1) high-quality, detailed descriptions of each case, which are useful for documenting uniqueness, and (2) important shared patterns that cut across cases and derive their significance from having emerged out of heterogeneity’ (Patton, 2002, p. 235). Employing maximum variation sampling, research can identify essential features and variable features of a phenomenon as experienced by diverse stakeholders among varied contexts to facilitate understanding about question in case. Presuming that different study designs illuminate different aspects of a phenomenon, maximum variation sampling can be utilized to construct a holistic understanding of the phenomenon by comparing information from more than one sample unit with several dimensions that separate them. It can also be drawn from ideas and methods of established study that were markedly different from each other on many dimensions.

2. **Disconfirming Cases** - Disconfirming cases 'are the examples that don't fit. They are a source of rival interpretations as well as a way of placing boundaries around sample unit, predicted outcome and confirming findings (Patton, 2002, p. 239).
3. **Critical Case Sampling frame**- Critical case sampling can facilitate 'logical generalizations' with the reasoning 'that "if it happens there, it will happen anywhere," or, vice versa, "if it doesn't happen there, it won't happen anywhere"' (Patton, 2002, p. 236). Critical case sampling employed as strategies to assist stakeholders in making informed decisions about the relevance of the problem For example, consider an innovation that produces desirable outcomes, but is being rejected by many practitioners as they believe that its implementation requires substantial resources. In such case it is useful to meet limits associated with required resources and promote logical defense and verify or challenging claims against results.
4. **Stratified Purposeful Sampling** - 'Stratified samples are samples within samples' where each stratum is 'fairly homogenous'. The purpose of stratified purposeful sampling is 'to capture major variations' even though 'a common core... may also emerge in the analysis' (Patton, 2002, p. 240). Stratified purposeful sampling is useful for examining the variations in the manifestation of a phenomenon as any key factor associated with the phenomenon is varied. Thus the factors for variation become rules to justify propositions, context in consideration, approaches, or concepts. Usually such study tacitly employ stratified purposeful sampling by clustering studies according to a key dimension of variation and then discussing each cluster in-depth. This is because integrating explicit results from statistical results and implicit impression from texts from sample unit beyond lived situation in site lose focus of quality in purpose. It also involves inappropriate application of methods and rules required to explain issue in site, lack consideration for least relevance of one context for another and distort assumptions of one over another. Moreover if the total N is more than 25 and the approach is mixed, it is appropriate to report percentages and conduct inferential statistics as technique to help confirm qualitative result with quantitative scores. Moreover Stake (1994) argues that the researcher's view of the generic and specific properties of a single case provides a basis for sampling decisions. The opportunity for detailed study, encompassing extensive variables as means to maintain balance or set of scales and variety found to be more important than satisfying selection criteria based on a sampling or case of attributes (Stake, 1994). By referring theory of "*symbolic interactional-ism*", he argue that

every case is a sample of its broader population; as similarities across a population are greater than differences between populations, and therefore that it is appropriate to treat each case as being, in general terms, representative of their population.

5. **Mixed Purposeful Sampling** – this sampling frame employs a combination of two or more sampling strategies to select evidence that adequately address study purpose. Mixed purposeful sampling can facilitate triangulation and flexibility in meeting the needs of multiple stakeholders (Patton, 2002). For example, study may strategically utilize propositions to draw generalizations at a higher level of abstraction. Then, they may employ typical case sampling to provide readers with an immediacy of typical studies that contributed towards informing the more abstract generalizations. When selecting a combination of sampling strategies, study must reflect on how those predictions, strategies and results complement each other.

3.5. Data Analysis and Presentation

The study used table of matrix to illustrate quantitative frequencies and concept analysis to categorize and organize qualitative themes in to respective themes and codes. That means for qualitative data the study adopted “*consonant comparison*” as method usual to “*integrative review*” to compare, contrast, analyzes and synthesizes related data’s and theories to complement the aim and proposition in question. Integrative research review approach promotes data reduction and comparison by summarizing major themes for analysis and display. That means the case used convergent quotes from comments, concept analysis derived from reflections to open ended questionnaires, field notes and vote counting or constant comparison to draw verbal or written implication from qualitative part and its implicit convergence with numerical data points or frequencies drawn from quantitative codes coded as composite construct to capture statistical data.

The study adopted “*concurrent triangulation*” strategy to integrate analysis drawn from qualitative and quantitative tools and sources of data. Usually, this concurrent triangulation approach is useful for the mixed research as it maintains an attempt to confirm, cross-validate, or corroborate and synthesis findings from two methods within a single design (Greene et al., 1989; Morgan, 1998; Steckler, McLeroy, Goodman; Bird, & McCormick, 1992). This model typically used as a means to offset the weaknesses inherent within one method with the strengths of the

other method. Convergent empirical figures from data helped strength of findings from case and knowledge claims in other study. Mixed methods model is advantageous because it is familiar to most researchers and can result in well-validated and substantiated findings. In addition, the concurrent data collection results in a shorter data collection time period as compared to those of sequential approaches.

In general as informed design, the data collected from respective tools and sources helped to compare, contrast and validate the findings. That means all instruments as open and close-ended questionnaire, field notes from participant observation, focus group discussion and theoretical proposition; appeared as complimentary and helped the analysis, integration and validity of findings. Based on methodological assertion to mixed approach, the cases followed thematic convergence and triangulation based on idea of *constant comparison or vote counting and concept analysis*; as criteria to verify relevance and integrate information drawn from both methods, sources and instruments to review. This provided the case with extra depth, to interpret data and to draw expected findings.

More over the case adopted idea of GLM (General Linear Model) as extra tool to take its special advantage to analyze quantitatively coded constructs to collect information and to help understanding direct and indirect effects and nature of relation among dependant and independent variables via appropriate statistical modeling. That means [GLM] promotes means to identify explicit level of effects related with independent variables on the values of multiple dependent variables, based on their relationships to categorical and scale predictors. In other words multivariate regression analysis is used to predict the value of one or more responses from a set of predictor(s) and to estimate the linear association between the predictors and responses. Predictors can be continuous or categorical or a mixture of both. Thus the case applied multivariate statistical command as valid method to analysis and appropriate statistical model to model the case. This is more clear form its powerful assumptions that; the vector of the dependent variables follows a multivariate normal distribution and the variance-covariance matrices are equal across the cells formed by the between-subjects effects. Moreover multivariate regression analysis promotes multi-statistical commands and advanced functions with special implications.

A multivariate command has both empirical and theoretical relevance for studies concerned with modeling “*support for democracy*” as general and to this related case with comparable aim in

particular. Scholars known in review of such studies - “support for democracy” are used to analyze sample survey either by data pooling or modeling system level cultural values at national level to make casual comparison of the results from statistical commands (Jusco & Shively 2005, 327–328). Anderson and Guillory (1997), for example, used *pooled survey data* from Western European countries and then analyzed the effects of country and individual-level covariates on satisfaction with democracy. Bratton and Mattes (2001) employed the “*casual comparison*” approach in their analysis of support for democracy in three African countries.

However the use of either of these above strategies has major limitations. On the *one* hand, though applying Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) techniques used to analyze pooled data have implications for the inferences one can draw about parameter estimates; the classic assumption of non correlation between disturbances [control] across observations is violated. This emerges because individuals in sample are supposed to be nested in the system level institutional values and their responses to covariates fluctuate as individual difference among sample. Under these conditions, standard errors will no longer be accurate and any inferences drawn from them will be misleading. On the *other* hand, the “*casual comparison*” approach leads to a loss of the large-N structure of the data and cannot provide estimates of the effects of country-level covariates on the dependent variable of interest (Jusco / Shively 2005: 328).

Multilevel models solve these limitations by developing cluster wise frame to data classification, organization and making use of the large-N [system level cultural variables] as structural part of data collection and analysis. Moreover, and perhaps most significantly, employing multilevel models is important for substantive, theoretical reasons (Steenburgen and Jones 2002: 219). First, the use of these models allows building and testing full models by specifying predictors at multiple levels of analysis. Second, by allowing parameters or factors to vary across units of analysis, multilevel models are sensitive to the possibility of causal heterogeneity. That means multivariate statistical commands provide advanced set of means to identify variables with direct [statistical] or indirect [underlying] issues by forward and backward analysis of such values to build appropriate model for study. For these reasons, multilevel models can be of great utility in bridging the above-mentioned gap between aggregate-level and individual-level theories and analyses of support.

Informed by such methodological guidance’s, used to help identifying appropriate commands for analysis; the review employed multivariate equation developed by Mattes / Bratton (2007). According

to R. Mattes and M. Bratton the individual-level, or level-one, equation of a multilevel model of support for democracy expressed as:

“ level of support corresponding to individual “i” nested in country-ε- – which is measured using satisfaction with or commitment for democracy SWD or CTD – as a linear function of an “intercept” and individual-level covariates”. Based on above model to measure data from population appears that:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{i1} + \beta_2 X_{i2} + \beta_3 X_{i3} \dots \beta_n + \epsilon_i +$$

Whereby: “Y” is dependent variable in which “i” -number of cases [slope parameters] are assessed from n-number of sample unit as $\beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{i1} + \beta_2 X_{i2} + \beta_3 X_{i3} \dots \beta_n X_n$ or β is a vector containing individual-level control covariates; and ϵ_i is independent predictor [system level institutional values] to infer effect of large N with statistical values either no effect with *P value* = 0 or certain effect with *P-values* different from 0, usually assumed to be significant at 0.0000. In other words “ ϵ_i ” represents both subscript in the intercept and the parameters associated with control covariates that may expected to vary across variables and the level-two units of the multivariate approaches to analysis. Such variance occurs because of autonomous [indirect] nature of impacts associated with manifest effects despite such effects bear direct, immediate and living memory.

In summary the review made qualitative analysis supported by quantitative modeling by classifying and integrating related thematic reflection collected from written responses to open - ended codes, field notes from observation, informal conversation regarding democracy, developmental strive to achieve such end and function of government as state agency. That means to support such thematic [qualitative] analysis, the review made statistical modeling to verify the finding with standard coefficients used to determine coo-relational relevance of dependent observation with autonomous or independent values, proposed as issues to matter predicted outcome in question. Thus, based on convergence of evidence with proposed questions the study employed triangulation of data from different tools and sources and explained evidence from the questions by conducting:-

- 1. Content Analysis:-** by developing quantitative and qualitative categories to promote analysis based on data typology and transcribing related texts and speeches along thematic category and in relation to observation
- 2. Concept analysis:** - on transcripts farmed from open-ended questionnaires and informal conversation

3. **Constant comparison** – by comparing, contrasting and sorting: field notes with standard themes; prevalence of categories in actions and behavior and consistencies and differences among related indexes. This is because consistencies between codes with similar meanings promote identifying respective category. So help specifying convergence or divergence of events.
4. **Statistical analysis** - as semi-experimental dimension in mixed method, the study employed statistical analysis since the sample is more than 25 and contains 10 to 20 indexes per variable or themes.

3.6. Strategies to keep validity

Informed by methodological claims that the validity of case based qualitative review as direct function of theoretical propositions behind study, standard tools to ensure key issues of “*construct validity*” and empirical considerations in field settings; the study asserts the following reasoning’s as rules of reference to support the validity and reliability of case as:-

1. **Construct validity** - drawn from standard tools used to design review tools and collect data. That means, thanks to “Afro-Barometer” research unit; the study employed standard indexes to code, collect, classify, and analyze both qualitative and quantitative data’s. This is clear from what methodological scholars as Yin (2002) asserts. He argues that the validity of qualitative study is about function of examining, categorizing, tabulating, semi-testing, and integration of both quantitative and qualitative evidence to address the initial propositions of a study” (Yin, 2002:109). Stake (1995) also adds that due to the ethical obligations, qualitative researchers need “to employ standard tools & procedures as rules to reduce misunderstanding – misrepresentation along data collection and analysis process and to help avoid simple repetition of data gathering as deliberative effort to find the validity of issue observed” (Stake, 1995, p. 109). Through these protocols along with member checking, researchers intend to “gain the needed confirmation, to increase credence in the interpretation, to demonstrate commonality of an assertion” (Stake, 1995, p. 112).

2. **Population to population triangulation** - made between main sample and contrast sample included to verify proposition from variance among purposive sample and extra sample used to compare and check convergence of proposition and purpose in case with sample unit in purpose and divergence of proposition and purpose in case with contrast sample.
3. The how's and why's regarding use of theories in mixed method and informed use of such rules as by Martins (2003). He asserts that validity of mixed method research findings are drawn from the steps in the process of research involving several questions as:

“Whether problem definition arises from the community in concern; the motivation to review arises from spending quality time with these communities (i.e., building trust? using an appropriate theoretical framework other than a deficit model); involve questions that lead to transformative answers with focuses to examine issues of authority and relations of power in institutions and communities); Whether data sources or the participants appropriately labeled; there is recognition of diversity within the target population; whether data analysis, interpretation and reporting raise new hypotheses; involves subgroups (i.e., multilevel study) to explore range of impacts associated with one level on other; whether the report help understand and elucidate power relationships and whether such outcome reveal issues that matter or facilitate social change”?
4. **Conformity of observation with propositions and findings** - methodological scholars as Flick [2007] asserts that the research is valid if it is reliable. That means if it is informed by theoretical lenses in framing research process; case based definite studies inspired by real subject on ground, involves naturalistic perspective with aim to understand essence of experience on the field and has purposive motivations to identify underlying issues behind such experience or what he calls “*researcher-subject interaction;*.” He asserts that since the review is an effect of such real interactions and in consideration to verify its reliability; validity becomes function of theoretical and empirical propositions, resources and steps used to justify reliability of results from study.
5. The methodological rule as by Stake (1995) that in qualitative study validity becomes function of analytical means adopted to present meaning and verification to first impressions as well as to final compilation”. He notes that the researchers initial impressions as the main source of data and making sense of them as the analysis to conclude the result as valid (Stake 1995: 71).

CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

4.1. Theoretical perspectives on concept of support for democracy

Scholars as Robert Matt and Larry Diamond assert that prospects for democratic transition require citizens to display unequivocal support for democracy, and outright rejection of any other (non-democratic) form of government. This means democrats need to be committed to help process of building democracy, beyond ideal support conditioned by cultural factors. However they argue that new democracies at initial process of transition suffer from lack of committed democrats to help complex process of building democracy. According to Norris; normative support for democracy is an outcome of century long learning and such deficit matter process of democratic transition and consolidation prolonged. She asserts that this type of support as “*diffuse*” support, by quoting Eason’s (1965) who first introduced the concept of “diffuse support”. Norris writes that “diffuse support relates to accumulated experience” (1999: 219). Thus she argues that long term general identities, in which institutional legacies surface, matter more than specific attitude towards reform measures and its actors.

More over Linz and Stepan (1996: 15) adds that in addition to the preference for democracy, citizens must perceive democracy to be successful, thus they must be satisfied with the performance of their democracy. They developed these two dimensions of democracy as frameworks used to compile a demand and supply model for democracy. On the demand side are the “committed democrats” – i.e. those who believe that democracy is always best, and at the same time reject any other non-democratic alternatives (feudal or traditional authority, presidential rule, military rule, and one-party rule) usual to political backgrounds of almost all new democracies. The supply side is a composite index of those individuals who believe in

experience of a “full democracy or a near full democracy” in a regime he/she belongs, and those who are very or fairly satisfied with the way democracy works.

The following six tables discuss how the above theoretical facts find itself and respond questions regarding for what effects, why or why not there is demand for democracy and satisfaction with achievement in a given regime. Table *one* assesses general or ideal level of demand for democracy without any implication about degree of commitment. Unlike Table 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6; Table *two* independent or indirect control to reveal actual level of commitment for democracy against ideal support by assessing level of preference for non democratic form of governance. Such commitment is character function of unqualified rejection of all non democratic form of governance. In other words table two is standard control variable to verify impacts associated with system level institutional factors on other three criterion variables those hold procedural and substantive issues expected from democracy in a given regime and two latent variables. Table *three* assesses support for elements to democracy, defined in developmental method of structuring support for democracy based on contextual issues that matter functional role of standard democratic principles.

4.1. Ideal level of support for democracy among instructors in college

1	Which of these statements is closest to your own opinion?	Freq.	%
A	Democracy is preferable to any other system of governance	35	57.37
B	In some situations, a non-democratic government can be preferable	17	27.86
C	For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have	7	11.47
D	Don't know	2	3.27
-	**** TOTAL ****	61	100

Table 1: Preference or demand for democracy

Source: afro-barometer research division working paper publication serious No 47

From the table above we can infer that most (57.37%) respondents prefer democracy as best system of governance though some significant numbers (27.86) of participants are conditional in their preference towards democracy. And other least number (14.7%) of participants are indifferent towards system of governance in general and democracy in particular.

However such 57% support granted for democracy in table one and 60% supportive reflections for democracy emerged from concept analysis of open-ended questionnaire, group discussion and interview becomes neither here nor there when examined in relation to codes developed to

implore preference for non democratic or cultural alternatives. This is clearer from other close ended indexes in the table 2 below. That means table two illustrates how much support for democracy is ideal and reveals definite lack of demand [commitment] for democracy. In other words, table 2 verifies whether such 57.5 % support for democracy involves true commitment or ideal desire to have democracy. Thus index two in table two provides means to understand effects of ex-institutional past on their demand for democracy [level of commitment] measured as outright rejection of other non democratic [cultural] alternatives.

4.2. Actual level of commitment for democracy among respondents

2	Among many ways to govern, which of the following alternatives, you approve or disapprove?	Approve	Disapprove
	If one party system commands the state than ineffective democracies as in most of 3 rd world nations.	24(39.34%)	37(60.65%)
	If all decisions were made by a council of elders, traditional leaders or chiefs.	27(44.26%)	34 (55.73%)
	If democracy governs based on our socio-cultural/historical values, beliefs and ways of life than to bring political change.	41(67.21)	20(32.78)
	If military government commands affairs of the state based on concept of centralized presidential dictatorship	22(36.06%)	39(63.93%)
	*****Total ****	114 46.72)	130 (53.27%)
*	In overall terms of those who prefer one or more of non-democratic form of government	47 (77%)	14(23%)

Table 2: Preference for Non-Democratic Government

Table 2 above shows; support for various types of non-democratic rule. Most (67%) of respondents hope that democracy should have to accommodate their socio-cultural values and beliefs before political change. Significant number (44.26%) of respondents prefer traditional leadership followed by (39.34%) of respondents support for one-party rule followed by (36 %) military leadership respectively. Though more than 50% of respondents disapprove non democratic alternatives; from methodological point of view; demand for democracy requires outright rejection of all four indexes to capture extent of preference for non democratic alternatives. Thus those who support one or more of non-democratic alternatives are far greater than those who completely rejects all four of non-democratic alternatives (77% Vs 23%); reveals far less than quarter of committed democrats. It also further reveals how feudal and autocratic memories had imposed powerful and enduring impact on perceived position of respondents

towards regime, its institutions and actors. This is the reason why Diamond (1999:162) claims support [commitment] for democracy as more of “*diffusive*” effect derived from century old or minimum of 64 year of experience of generation with democracy as socio-political institution to them than immediate gift to enjoy.

For such kind of mixed political attitude Ronald Inglehart (1993) quotes that “*lip service to democracy is almost universal today.*” Norris (1999) also argues that, “by the end of the twentieth century, overwhelming support is given to the principle of democracy as an ideal form of government, even among citizens living under flawed regimes characterized by widespread abuse of human rights and civil liberties. Thus lack of such committed democrats to help process of building democracy implies issues that can affect efforts to realize full socio-political [democratic] transition.

These theoretical facts and empirical pictures are clear from the figures that only 23% committed democrats appear out of 57% ideal support for democracy in table one when the support is examined in relation to preference for non democratic alternatives, in above table. As illustrated in table 2 above; most (77%) of respondents lack actual demand for democracy, which reveals least number of committed democrats; out of [57%] ideal support granted to democracy in table one.

In order to test whether such figures illustrated in table 2 above with open-ended responses, group discussion and what the researcher observed as member to research community; it appears that most [75%] of themes organized from such data shows support for one or more of non democratic alternatives. Though transcribed as different expression for similar meaning; the issue is clear from the claim that democracy should have to be:

“Top down, parochial, panacea, heaven on earth, instant material gift from government, context and duty free idea to enjoy special personal rights, appear as physical body than ideal political thought”

Thus given the fact that committed democrats are those citizens who show complete support for democracy as the best system, and at the same time reject *all* forms of non-democratic rule; the above reflections demonstrates lacks of consistent support direction, either for democracy or for other non democratic alternatives. This implies enduring effect of cultural values that severely conditioned demand for democracy, which is found to be an outcome of prolonged experience.

For such kind of figure Larry Diamond (1996), argues democratic support requires a “moral commitment and emotional allegiance or duty,” both of which develop over time and partially as a result of performance. This is the reason why he further asserts that attempting to consolidate democracy; a government must aim to achieve mass level, a “broad normative and behavioral consensus” on the desirability of the support system.

In terms of institutional perspective, though the emergence of developmental model in Ethiopia, seems like or as result of what “*new institutional*” scholars (March and Olsen) call as “massive institutional failure” that opened window opportunity for heroic socio-political founders; the change created by historic moment itself also affected by remaining residues of institutional legacy and create elements of “historical inefficiency” (March and Olsen 1984). That is the socio-political impacts of institutional legacies are autonomous from strategic capacity of reform endeavors, golden opportunity in historical moment and awareness of public to control its costs and benefits. They further stresses that long established institutional legacies; imposes powerful impact on public motivation towards reform initiatives; regardless of popular support the reform established, strategies it followed and extent of achievements brought by such efforts (March 1984). This is the reason why respondents in this case, prefer for democracy without rejecting other non-democratic alternatives and fell negative towards federal structures, contrary to top down institutional backgrounds in past, as reviewed above in the table 1, 2 and 3 respectively.

From transitional point of view the figure implies the fact that democracy and democrats grow on the cultural context thorough long process of learning and not given by birth. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) convince this fact and argue that both economic development and democracy can be attributed to “fixed national effects.” Other scholars as Pipe Norris also argue that support for democracy, is the outcome of socio-political learning though not easy to learn for nations in transition given tensions between democratic ideals and the perceived criteria citizens take as rule in evaluating regime performance (1999: 270). Thus culture matters, as identified fact and implies how much it has potential influence on reform efforts to transform institutional functioning.

Beyond inbuilt nature of challenges linked with institutional change as ex-post effect in general; for this article the difficulties can further inferred from why Samuel Hamilton (1996) identifies exclusively deep rooted nature of Ethiopian cultural values that has to bear unique effect on

Ethiopia's democratic transition from most other countries undertaking the 3rd wave democratization efforts.

Support for elements to democracy: – in response to contextual factors [as social diversity, communal identity, primitive solidarity], scholar's structure support for new democracies based on real issues on grounds that surface values in which democracy to grow. For that end they hypothesize that demand for democracy and satisfaction with its achievement in new democracies of Africa can be explained in relation to democratic accommodation of socio-cultural diversity and grass root bond embedded around such dividing lines (Lijphart 1977 Connor 1990 Horowitz, 1991). They argue that demand for democracy as new regime in Africa can be drawn from communitarian values produced by centuries of life in small villages under conditions of ecological scarcity, seasonal uncertainty, and group solidarity-organized around local identities. Thus they indicate that demand for democracy and its subsequent growth has challenges at initial process to transform such fragmented identity [confined around traditional social ties] before establishing mutual identity, defined in terms of democratic citizenship, institutional and interpersonal trust.

3	Which of the following statements is closest to your view?	SD	DA	NS	FA	SA
3.1	Government in Ethiopia is committed to solve any potential problem that can pose challenges on citizen's well being and national progress	13	15	7	21	5
3.2	Development strategies to resolve group difficulties, as poverty at national level, support democratic freedom of individuals	7	13	11	21	9
3.3	Federal arrangements in our country addressed issues of social diversity via mutual equality and self administration.	17	11	12	14	7
3.4	Common goods are complementary to support private rights, freedoms and opportunities.	6	13	9	20	13
4.5	Citizens are more important for the process of building democracy and control unfair or corrupt official practices than government in place or system of rules	3	6	8	13	31
3.6	The members of the 'national assembly' represent the people; so they should make laws for this country.	7	15	7	19	13
3.7	Our present system of government should be given more time to deal with inherited problems.	11	15	14	12	9
3.8	Public participation to address social problems as poverty and corruption at local level promotes democracy more than any free & fair election at national level	8	10	11	15	17
3.9	Civil servants or employees should have to act based on more of public interest and goals than personal interests, reasons.	5	11	7	7	31
Sub and aggregate total in percent		77	109	86	142	135
		163 =	15.6	277 =		

Table 3: **Support** for elements to democracy defined in terms of socio-political contexts on ground and indigenous cultural values

Note: **SD**-(Strongly disagree), **DA**-(disagree), **NS**-(not sure), **FA** (fairly agree) **and SA**-(strongly agree

Source: afro-barometer research division publication serious No 47, with little modification to capture case context, as federalism and grass root support motivations.

From the table above we can infer that most participants acquainted with civic duty to democracy in general and duties special to emerging democracies. That is at initial process, democracy is loaded with burdens that make difficult its socio-political function without citizens grass root interest with elements to democracy, their determination to prevent anti-democratic forces, usual to emerging democracy and to help government efforts[if any] to succeed such end.

Though most of codes in table 3 are positive; theoretically the frequency has negative implications. That means such a figure in African cultural context shows communitarian values produced by centuries of life in small villages under conditions of environmental scarcity, seasonal uncertainty and group solidarity organized to defend challenges rather than such relevant input with progressive or democratic values to contribute for mutual growth and institutional transformation. Thus scholars identify three challenges; new democracies can face in 3rd world, especially in Africa. They argue that communal values in Africa lack modern values required cultivating democracy and strong sense of overarching national identity due to highly diverse character of social composition, in terms of ethnicity and language. Thus they assert that emerging democracies, in countries new to culture of democracy, lack socio-political values as respect, mutual trust, individual responsibility or risk tolerance, required to help process of building democracy (Lijphart, 1977; Connor, 1990; Horowitz, 1991, Chazan, 1993; Etounga-Manguelle, 2000).

Like empirical perspectives above, from methodological perspectives, these “*ideal*” positive figures contrary to other most indexes to case; has less positive implications than appeared as in table. That is as matter of fact, methodological professionals identifies that most participants in social research more and more agree with questions stated as in an ideal narrative story than to work out for its full realization. That also means; in social research general affirmative statements [hard to achieve but easy to agree] are perceived as more positive than issue specific

codes those touch real life conditions of participants in sample. Leech labels this behavior, as “acquiescence,” implying; an endorsement of an assertion made in a question, regardless of the assertion’s content. The behavior could result from a desire to be polite rather than confrontational in interpersonal interactions (Leech, 1983),

This is the reason why commitment for communal values in table three index 3.2, 3.5, 3.8, and 3.9; appears wishful desire compared to low commitment to help such values for democratic and transformed end through federal strategies in 3.4. The issue is clear from, quantitative figures, in which most (46%) of participants perceive federalism as problem compared to 35% support provided for it regardless of 19% neutral position. With reference to thematic analysis from reflections to open ended codes, regarding federalism, respondents express their opinion as that lack of good governance, nepotism and corruption as issues affecting federalism.

Regarding earlier studies about federalism; scholars indicate that federal strategies to promote self administration involve paradoxes of nepotism and lack of means to sustain good governance. According to Tesfaye Habiso 2010, 2015 and Kelsall, 2013: 105; the challenges to federal administration are associated with concerned manipulation of self administration at local level of administration that imposed perceived and actual impact on free flow of capital and labor, their motivation to work.

The second core issue among elements to democracy most participants get difficult to accept is, “time intensive” nature of building democracy based on concept of change in progress, in recognition to prolonged effect of democracy. This implies lack of determination to share risks internal to any deliberate action aimed to build democracy or other painful efforts required to succeed major reform initiatives. For the case Ronald Matte (2001) argues citizens in emerging countries lacks not only risk tolerance due to effect of inherited legacies of status queue and ever painful nature of transitional process, but also tolerance itself is commonly consequence of democracy, which is far from real.

More over significant number (43%) of respondents in table three index one, understand and recognize extent of government determination to sustain citizen’s well being and country progress than they demand for democracy. Then this implies how much institutional manifestation of cultural values are autonomous and enduringly conditioned meaningful

disposition. This is clear from other indexes in table 10 and 13 to capture effects associated with system level cultural values in terms of trust and perceived level of corruption by respondents. That means respondents recognize socio-economic role of government as more relevant than they trust regime, its institutions and actors.

4.3. Performance of current Democracy

Democratic performance can usually be assessed in terms of generally perceived quality, satisfaction and issue specific indexes to capture such quality and satisfaction. Performance of democracy as major component to measure public satisfaction with regime; implies that the intrinsic value of democracy has little role if a given perceived regime does not deliver the political goods that distinguish democracy from other regime types.

4	In your opinion, how much of a democracy is Ethiopia today	Freq.	%
	A full democracy	0	-
	A democracy, but with some minor problems or exceptions	14	22.95
	A democracy, but with major problems	25	40.98
	Not a democracy	19	31.14
	Do not understand question or what a democracy is about	1	1.63
	Don't know	2	3.27
	*****Total*****	61	100

Table 4: Quality of Democracy

Table 4 above shows that, except 22.95 % percent of respondents claim democracy with minor problems in Ethiopia; the remaining 40.95% of respondents feel major problems concerning democracy in Ethiopia followed by 31.14 % not a democracy at all. The remaining 3.27% of, respondents not clear about question followed by 1.6% are don't know whether democracy or not.

As noticed in table one and as analytical logic that the incidence of figures from respective indexes are interdependent than independent explanatory power to draw implications; then table four above, cannot be explained to understand whether the quality of democracy is low or high rather to capture general level of quality which is difficult to explain without issue specific indexes with implications to identify deficit. Thus the true level of democratic quality would be identified from the table 5 with 8 issue specific codes. That means in order to explain generally perceived range of democratic quality by respondents in table 4 above; we do have one more issue specific indexes to explain democratic performance: “regime performance”.

Regime performance - can be assessed by positive ratings of regime (as in table 5 below) with perceived or actual democratic role of regime on selected procedural and substantive issues tied to actual life of citizens with a given existing regime. These eight indexes, as core components to assess political performance of regime, as below in table 5; shows extent of satisfaction with regime performance, as function of actual supply and provide clear implication to identify and examine factors those affected commitment for democracy.

Table 5: Positive Ratings of democracy as regime on selected procedural and substantive Issues

5	How much do you think our current democracy ensures the following rights for citizens?	Very well	Fairly well	Not sure	poor	Very poor
5.1	Freedom to say what one thinks (speech)	11	17	11	13	9
5.2	Freedom to join any political organization one wants	7	12	3	15	23
5.3	Freedom from fear of being arrested when you are innocent	6	12	13	14	16
5.4	Freedom to choose who to vote for without feeling forced	6	14	7	13	21
5.5	The ability of ordinary people to influence what government does	7	12	7	16	19
5.6	Equal and fair treatment of all people by government	4	12	3	17	25
5.7	People have access to basic necessities	5	16	10	19	11
5.8	Ethiopians are equal to one another	4	11	11	14	21
	TOTAL	49	94	65	113	146
		= 143 =		13.3	= 259 =	
		29.31%		1%	53.07%	

Table 5: Positive ratings of perceived democratic performance (supply) by participant

The results as presented in Table 5 above demonstrate that only 29.30% of participants feel general positive democratic performance on the current regime. However, based on index wise explicit analysis, shows that except (47.54%) of respondents claiming freedom of speech and 18.03% percent neutral positions; only 25-30% respondents fell practice of democracy towards other seven remaining variables. This is clear from the figure that; only (26.22 %) of respondents fell equal treatment by government, followed by freedom from fear of being arrested when you are innocent (29.50%), freedom to join any political organizations and popular influence over

government action (31.14 %), freedom to vote without feeling pressured, (32.78%), respectively concerned.

While citizens drive quality of democracy from what they benefit from democracy, as outcome, the picture shows low quality of democracy. Political thinkers as, Diamond L (1999) notes that; democratic quality as direct reflection of “regime performance” and as a crucial variable that affects the development and internalization of beliefs about “support” (1999: 77). Thus the picture in this case seems far less than average or potential, as illustrated above.

It is possible to explain the results from table 5 above, both from theoretical and empirical point of view. Beginning from least (26.22 %) positively felt position, as “*equal and fair treatment of every citizen by government*”, for example, shows unusual negative perception towards regime performance. Theoretically, scholars link such kind of too negative perception with the way citizens define their institutional identification [political status], either being in support of, winner and loyal to regime, its actors or loser or neutral towards regime and its actors. That is, though conditioned by cultural factors and regime performance; political status of being winner or loser, matters regime support regardless of range of its systematic efficiency or inefficiency. That means those who have a party identification with the incumbent government (winners) are significantly more satisfied with the way democracy works than are those who do not; losers and non-partisans (Anderson and Guillory, 1997).

The issue is clearer from the figure that more than 60% of respondents take partisan position claiming that:

“The role of democracy depends on good will of government or other political bodies than internal to individuals, groups, or civil bodies and society at large”

For such issues that divide citizens along partisan political or institutional lines scholars as (Blair, 2000; Bratton, et al., 1999); finds those institutional attachments [political status] in which citizens and political bodies identify themselves are basic explanatory factor and has strong effect on citizen’s level of satisfaction with regime performance, regardless of level of performance. He claims that, in Africa there is not only strongly established sense of favor politics derived to serve family and friends, but also concept of “zero sum game” political motivations that narrow energies of mutual trust and cooperation required to bond mutual

political society. Moreover he argues that social diversity as case more special in Africa that furthers dividing line among public.

More again political scientists as (Kaase and Newton) argues that though democracy is about winning and losing within a context of given rules; it necessarily generates ambivalent attitudes towards authorities on the part of the losers” (Kase and Newton, 1995: 60). At the simplest level, if people feel that the rules of game allow the party they endorse to be elected to power, they are more likely to feel that representative institutions are responsive to their needs so that they can trust the political system, and consequently, they are inclined to be satisfied with the government’s performance (Lambert, et al., 1986) and with the way the system works (Kornberg and Clarke 1994). On the other hand, those whose preferred party loses are more likely to feel that their voice is excluded from the decision-making process, producing dissatisfaction with political institutions.

Moreover, domestic political researchers as Tesfaye Habiso identified that; due to effect of top down institutional culture of hierarchy and secrecy; both civil and political agents in public position perceives political dialogue from sense self defense, confrontation, risk perception and suspicion (Tefaye Habiso 2014 and 2016). He argues that most challenges to promote mutual political society in Ethiopian are negative effect of institutional legacies. He asserts that due to such effects most of individuals and groups with political interest organize themselves with aims to secure public power for private gains and re-harsh one another without any mutual end. Tesfaye argues that challenges associated with such mentality goes beyond realms of political ethics and affected all civil institutions including religious groups, NGO’S, public employees, their labor discipline and sense of public sentiments. He asks why such public figures with social duty and individuals under such associations hedge their purpose around narrow sense of family confines, conditioned with self serving motives to secure personal benefits and farm favor at expense of public authority. Driving data from electronic sources, Tesfaye concludes that:

most of conversation in electronic media reflects partisan position accompanied with some sort of personal drive for favor, power or wealth and found almost no statement with rational grounds that identify potential inefficiencies usual to any public bodies, except bipolar favor positions marked with emotional assaults against either government or other opposition parties ...something is wrong or right because of government or other opposition parties, based on blind identification one finds himself/herself as being supporter or in opposition towards any external

political objects....that one supports or opposes respective external political objects because either nothing is wrong with this or because of nothing is right with that...

Finally, political scientists identify that extreme negative perception towards a given political objects; as political parties and state institutions implies ignorance to accept mutual reality, either for good or bad and state of others. They assert that such predispositions are reflected from individuals and groups with strong sense of conservative values related with either inborn trait or functional manifestation of conservative socio-political tradition embedded in an institutional culture.

Unlike other five variables, illustrated about demand for democracy via examining macro cultural factors that conditioned expected demand and micro perception of population in case with issue specific regime performance; table ‘6’ below summarizes general level of satisfaction with democracy as combined effect of performance as:

6	Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Ethiopia? Are you...	Freq.	%
	Very satisfied	1	1.63
	Fairly satisfied	17	27.86
	Not very satisfied	8	13.11
	Not satisfied at all	28	45.90
	Ethiopia is not a democracy	7	11.47

Table 6: Satisfaction of participants with democracy in Ethiopia

From table 6 we infer that satisfaction with democracy as second additional aspect of regime performance shows that the respondents are, to a large extent, felt dissatisfied with the general state of democracy they experienced. The percentage of respondents who are either very or fairly satisfied are, only about 29.50 percent followed by 13% respondents with average sense of satisfaction. The remaining most (45%) respondents feel not at all satisfied with democracy followed by (10%) respondents with extreme sense of bipolar feeling, that Ethiopia is not a democracy. The overall picture of two sub-items: regime performance and range of subsequent satisfaction, appears quit low. While less than one in three had a positive view on the quality of democracy, more than two-in-three is dissatisfied with the current state of affairs.

4.3. Perceived level of State Capacity and Government Performance

This implies ability of State to enforce laws and government capacity to handle issues that undermine role of democracy to serve public. For the first sub index respondents are asked to

reflect their views on the government/state’s capacity to enforce the law when: **a)** serious crimes are committed; **b)** taxes are not paid or arbitrary; and **c)** household services such as water and electricity are obtained without payment. Though this index is not related to cultural issues, without understanding state capacity to sustain public security from criminal elements and control antidemocratic forces, those undermine socio-political function of democracy; become weak to understand conditioning effect of instrumental factors on cultural values. The results are presented in table 7 below.

7	How likely you think that the authorities could enforce the law, if a person likes yourself...?	Very likely	Most likely	Not sure	unli kely	Very unlikely
	Committed a serious crime	19	15	13	9	5
	Did not pay tax on some of income they earned	21	15	12	8	5
	Obtained domestic services as water & electricity without paying	13	17	11	11	9
	*****Sub Total ****	53	47	36	28	19
	*****Aggregate total*	100 =	54.64	19.6	47 =	25.65

Table 7: State capacity to enforce the Law

From three item state capacity indexes in the table above; most of respondents perceive government as capable of enforcing institutional rules and regulation. This is clear from the table that most (59.01 %) of respondents fell positive on institutional capacity of government to maintain state income and fair tax administration, followed by (55.73 %) government capacity to protect security of citizen’s from criminals and equally significant (49.18%) of respondents; believe on regimes ability to deliver possible socio-physical service to the public.

This 2nd positive performance variable among seven other core indexes; implies an extent of government capability as actor to the existing regime and efforts provided to qualify Ethiopia as developmental state.

Diamond writes that political performance is partially dependent upon whether a government is able to offer its citizens physical safety and security, which implies protecting them against harm from especially criminal elements (1999: 89), but also against those who undermine the democratic system by violating its principles used to promote better administration.

Policy Performance: as theory, as well as for the purpose of this article; policy performance is assessed by comparing specific sets of policy performance on public issues or on a so-called “people’s agenda” and rating those achievements in issue specific or practical domains, tied

with actual and perceived conditions of oneself or others as citizens in given socio-political community as below in table 9 and 10 respectively.

8	In your opinion, what are the most pressing problems facing this country that the government should have to address?	Freq.	%
	Unemployment/job creation	5	8.19
	Poverty	33	54.09
	Food shortage	3	5
	Wages, income and salaries	16	26.22
	Education	4	6.55

Table 9: The “Peoples’ Agenda”

In the table above respondents matter that poverty and the issues of wages, income or salaries respectively (54.09, 26.22) as most pressing issues facing the country. That is in the table above most (54.09) respondents perceives “*poverty*” as most serious problem though government achieved world record poverty reduction outcomes from 46 in 2001 to 26 % in 2013. World Bank in its (2013) report also recognizes this unprecedented poverty reduction measures and outcomes as ever highest as any other nations in Africa.

The issues of wages, income or salaries as 2nd negatively held felt by most respondents is somehow reasonable to perceive as such painful issue, given public employee with fixed income in the face of growing economy based on principle of free market. That means as newly adopted mode of production unusual to our socio-economic tradition; it may become difficult to tolerate intense competition and potential risks associated with capitalism, which requires unique combination of socio-economic skills to keep competitive advantage. This is also the reason why political scholars as (Dalton and Anderson) insists that transitional process creates difficulties for both citizens and government not only because of inefficiencies usual to transitional process but also it requires painful efforts and decades of patience until structural transformation, to yield fruits that reach all (Dalton, 1994, Anderson, 1995). According to Dalton, the issue matters that government ability to deliver immediate income and welfare benefits is limited by the necessity of taking measures of economic structural adjustment.

Miller and Listhaug (1999: 212) also add that citizens of a country can use many different criteria for measuring their satisfaction with governmental performance. Amongst these are the absolute levels of outputs or benefits; comparing what they receive with what they think the average citizen ought to receive; or comparing past benefits with current outputs.

9	How well or badly would you evaluate that the government is handling the following issues?	Very well	Fairly well	Not sure	Poor	Very poor
	Creating jobs	2	24	8	21	6
	Keeping prices stable	2	14	5	19	21
	Narrowing income gaps	2	9	7	17	27
	Addressing educational needs of people	9	21	6	17	9
	Fighting corruption in government agency or officials	1	10	3	17	30
	TOTAL	16	78	29	91	93
		94= 30.81%		9.50	181= 60.37	

Table 10: Positive Ratings of Government Performance on Selected Policy Issues

As related issue to table 9 this table (10) reveals that little less than 50% of respondents approve of government's performance in job creation and responding educational needs of public, followed by 10% neutral respondents. However, the government is ever negatively perceived, regarding three issues. These most negatively perceived three issues are corruption, income gap and price instability. For this respective issues, most (77%) respondents perceive government as either poor or very poor to fight corruption, followed by (72 %) of respondents claiming that government least committed to narrow income gaps and other (65%), of respondents claiming problem of prices instability that is not concerned as a difficulty to citizens by government.

Though the issue of corruption is admitted as problem that government provided special focus as part of it GTP II agenda to solve; the perception seems deep. The other two issues of price instability and income gaps can plausibly explained from burdens internal to every growing economy in transitional process, regardless of its overall outcome at national level. That is, economies in transition, involves relative macro-economic issues of inflation and income gap, usual to growing economy derived by the idea of free market, which is more sever at initial stage of implementation. That also means economies in transitional stage of growth associated with depressed features of competition to meet public expectations, until complete transformation of market system, to ensure productive efficiency and wide reaching distributional appropriation. In

other words, though progressive in terms of overall output; growing economies in transition accompanied with not only relative inflation and income gap but also composed of winners and losers, new to socio-economic structure of poor society emerging from passive features of absolute poverty. This is the case why Chang (1999) defines developmental state as one that engages in institutional building to promote growth and development; and plays a critical role in resolving the conflicts that arise out of reactions and counteractions to the development trajectory between winners and losers (Chang 1999: 192-99). More over transitional achievements inspired by radical reform efforts brings not only new socio-economic actors, but also excessive expectation informed by potential change, fledged by reform packages. These are the theoretical and empirical grounds for the article to allege why respondents felt negative on price stability and income gap regardless of ever high, double digit GDP (10-13) growth achieved in Ethiopia, more especially after 2007 onwards to present, 2016.

However the overall picture appears far from what Asnake Kefale (2011), asserts about the double digit GDP growth rate and its effects, since 2011. He adds that such economic performance has shown also decline in the income inequality at the national level. Referring from the findings of the 2011 Household Income and Expenditure Survey; he identifies that income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, declined slightly from 0.30 to 0.29 between 2004 and 2011. More again, World Bank in its (2013) international inequality index reports that distributional effects of economy in country reflects income equality, which placed Ethiopia at top rank among other African nations.

In order to test such statistical figures illustrated in table 7, 8, and 9, open-ended interview reflection for code –“what do you think as most pressing problem that the government should have to provide immediate response as key actor to sustain socio-political progress of state and economic condition of citizens.” Key themes emerged from such open-ended reflections converges with what has been illustrated in the tables above and indicates that the following issues matter most (70%) of respondents and they claims that:

Poverty-X5, discrimination based on political and social difference[X5], corruption[X3] economic equality, inflation, income gap [X3], lack of democracy[X3], individual rights and freedom [X3], unemployment[X3], quality education, lack of voice for educated professionals, freedom and free press, political equality, federalism, justice, equal treatment of all people by government]

4.4. Academic trust on regime actors and its institutions [political Trust]

Theoretically scholars explain political trust as “a basic evaluative orientation toward the government founded on how well the government is operating according to people’s normative expectations” (Hetherington 1998). It is very important for the consolidation of democratic governments, because, as Mishler and Rose (1997) quoted Gamson, “it serves as the creator of collective power.” This puts the government in a position to make decisions and apply resources without having to resort to coercion or needing specific approval for its decisions from citizens. According to Miller and Listhaug Political trust, implies to, the “judgment of the citizenry that the system and the political incumbents are responsive, and will do what is right even in the absence of constant scrutiny” (Miller and Listhaug 1990: 358). As such, “political trust is a central indicator of public’s underlying feeling about its polity” (Newton and Norris 2000: 53). Political trust can be directed towards the political system and its organizations as well as the individual political incumbents. Organizational or system level political trust is referred to as the *macro level trust*. It is an issue-oriented perspective whereby citizens become trustful or distrustful of government “because they are satisfied or dissatisfied with policy alternatives” (Miller 1974: 951). The organizational political trust comprises *diffuse or system-based trust* and *specific or institution-based trust*. Diffuse political trust refers to the citizens’ evaluation of the performance of the overall political system and the regime. Specific political trust, on the other hand, is directed towards certain political institutions, such as the Congress or the local police force. The *micro-level or individual political trust*, happens when trust is directed towards individual political leaders. The individual political trust involves a person-oriented perspective whereby citizens become trustful or distrustful of government “because of their approval or disapproval of certain political leaders” (Citrine 1974: 974-75).

10	How much do you “trust” the following state agencies?	Always	Most times	Not sure	Some times	Never
	Prime minster	2	19	11	8	21
	National Assembly(parliament)	1	18	11	10	21
	Community Authority Councils	0	12	10	10	29
	Ruling Party	3	11	11	15	21
	Opposition Parties	3	13	14	12	19
	Traditional leaders	12	19	10	13	7
	Courts of law	1	13	14	15	18
	****Total****?	22	95	81	83	135
		127 = 29.74		19	219=51.28	

Table 11: Trust in Selected Political Actors

Table 11 shows substantial lack of trust on regime and its agencies in which prime minister secures only 34.42% of trust, followed by national assembly or parliament (31.14%) and ruling party and courts of law, each (22.95%) of trust score. Community authority council scores (19.67%) of trust, which is least among regime actors. Opposition party secures 26.22% trust.

Traditional leaders are most trusted institutions among public figures; scoring 50.81% trust count. This special trust towards traditional leadership can implies effect of socialization and socio-political background, identified as enduring impact on meaning and purpose of citizen's socio-political motivations and why there is lack of demand for democracy, as discussed in table 2.

When tested by reflections to open-ended codes, the picture seems that 70% of respondent's level of trust towards state actors conditioned by partisan identity. Like least level of demand for democracy, regardless of cognitive awareness of sample; themes emerged to this code reflects favor identity, as expression of institutional tradition or effect of cultural legacy. It can also be referred from simple figures as in table 11, indicating why significant number of respondents provided relative trust for prime minister and national assembly compared to the party they represent. This is also more again clear from least perceived trust provided to local authority, where interpersonal trust grows and political trust surfaces. In general least level of perceived trust towards local political authority, followed by ruling party and most trust granted to traditional authority; lack of democratic social capital to ensure trust than special case to trust social actors over political agents.

Though expressed in a too short memo [for matter of research ethics]; the issue is clear from concept analysis, drawn from powerful themes emerged from codes to this index that seems or convey a message with an implication that:

“Trust or distrust is must because of sole ground to gouge every issue around organizational identity; but nothing else, other criteria to trust rest.”

Theoretically, high levels of political trust translate into the positive reception of both elected officials and political institutions and provide institutions with enduring support, irrespective of how those who are running the government perform (Hetherington 1998: 803). He indicates that

though high level political trust basic to promote mutual institutional building among political community; it never be too little or too much. This is because too little trust in political relation prevents growth of civil society and excessive trust promotes political apathy and encourages a loss of citizen control of government, both of which affects democratic consolidation.

On the other hand, political, economic and rational theories of political behavior views; political trust as a form of specific supports that is primarily dependent upon assessments of institutional performance. Mishler and Rose write that, from this performance perspective, trust rests upon individual evaluations of the competency with which political institutions provide what they deem to be valuable social, economic and political benefits (1997: 434). If a government is trusted, its mistakes will be disregarded as an inevitable part of an attempt to cope in difficult circumstances – if it is viewed with distrust, dissatisfaction with performance will be viewed as proof of incompetence or dishonesty (Rose, Mishler and Heaper 1998).

In addition, Lozano (2002) argues demographic composition as other basic factor that can affect relevance of regime performance and government strive to achieve optimal policy outcomes and keep political trust. He found that in “developing world”, middle-income groups are structurally most likely to be frustrated and distrustful of governments (Lozano 2002). This is the case because in developing country, the poor enter into clientelistic relations with the state and the wealthy achieve relative privilege or access to state power, which creates perceived and actual challenge on middle class to gain access to state power and furthers sense of isolation, hence distrust. In general least level of support for democracy as discussed above itself shows lack of trust. This is clear from Norris assertion that “high dissatisfaction with democracy and extremely low levels of trust almost unequivocally go together” (Norris 1999, 228-33).

4.4.1. Trust towards elected leaders in terms of “responsiveness”

11	How often do you think that elected leaders try their best to serve or listen to the public interests?	freq.	%
	Never	25	40.98
	Some times	19	31.14
	Most times	7	11.47
	Always	3	5
	Don't know	7	11.47

Table 12 perceived extent of responsiveness by elected officials

Table 12 illustrates that except some 16% of participants affirming all or most time, public motivation of elected officials to serve society and 31.14% respondents reflecting sense of below average motivation of elected officials to listen and serve public interest; the remaining most (40.98%) of participants perceives elected officials as irresponsible at all, followed by other 11.47% of respondents with neutral position, indifferent to whether elected officials listen to and serve people or not. Given methodological assertion that only positive [above average] point scales are used to analysis; the issue seems most serious problem. This resonate lessons for local officials to concern the fact that citizens evaluate efficiency of government from community experience and community in parliamentary system is an area where citizens account governors and democracy surfaces.

4.6. Corruption perception among instructors towards social and political actors

Although the perception of corruption has more of theoretical implication to explain findings than necessarily reflections of real instances of corruption; it remains important factor that affect political attitudes of citizens and their trust (as discussed above in table 11) toward the state, its institutions and government. The following figure in table 13 blow shows perceived prevalence of severe corruption by respondents.

12	How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption?	All of them	Most of them	Don't know	Some of them	None of them
	Officials in the council of ministers	15	25	5	15	1
	Officials in the local government	20	25	3	11	2
	Police	11	18	6	23	3
	Judges and courts	10	21	5	20	5
	Local businessmen	13	26	4	16	2
	School administrators	7	15	11	20	8
	Religious leaders	7	8	7	23	16
	Traditional leaders	7	9	9	24	12
	*****sub-total *****	91	147	50	142	49
	*****aggregate *****	238= 48.77		10.24	191= 39.13	

Table 13: Perceived range of corruption among socio-political bodies

The above table shows that five state agencies are perceived to be highly corrupt institutional actors. Accordingly most (73.37%) respondents perceive that all or most of officials in the local government are as first most corrupt agencies, followed by federal officials in the council of ministers (65.57), local businessmen (63.93%), Judges and courts (50.81%) and police force (47.54%). At mid range of positive and negative end, some (36.0%) respondents feel school

administrators as corrupt. Traditional and religious leaders are least corrupt agencies among public institutions with respective (26.22 %) and 24.59%) negative corruption perception.

The problems even more clear from views reflected from open ended codes and group discussion, in which most of participants perceive that most public actors as corrupt. More again they claims that lack of accountability and clear cut corrective measures as, well as government tolerance of corrupt officials as source for the problem.

13	Which would you say less harmful option if corrupt officials unable to provide timely response for your request to get social service or legal permission to do something	Freq.	%
	Don't worry, just wait, the permit will come	5	8.19
	Offer a tip or gift to the official	6	9.38
	Use connections to influential people	13	21.31
	Write a letter to the head office	8	13.11
	Do what I want without the permission	2	3.27
	Do nothing because nothing can be done	21	34.42
	Don't know	6	9.38

Table 13: Attitudinal disposition of participants towards issues corruption

The table above shows that most (34.42%) respondents suppose do nothing because nothing can be done, followed by 21% respondents claiming role of connection with key people. Among least preferred option is bribery (offering a tip or gift to the official). On average one-in ten respondents would consider this an option. This figure implies that almost all participants have a low propensity and tendency to bribes.

4.7. Level of Partisanship and Political interest among instructors

The concept of “Partisanship and Political Mobilization” as most core variable in political science research index; explains motivational origin and structure of citizens’ mobilization in political study of public affairs and its effect on political process and socio-economic outcome. Dalton (1984) argues importance of partisanship and political mobilization to examine motivational dimension, origin, purpose and effect of individual and group interest to participate in political process. He compiled a 2X2 grid as methodological structure to study mobilization dimension that drive political motivation of citizens.

14	Whom do you think to mobilize, organize or direct people for political or economic purposes beyond election campaign?	Freq.	%
	Government and other contending political parties	23	37.70
	Citizens to mobilize themselves as free agents based on their socio-political	38	62.29

Table 15 Mobilization dimension of citizens

The table shows that most (63%) of respondents prefer internal cognitive awareness to determine their political interest and choices. The remaining 37 % respondents prefer external political bodies to organize and direct their political choice.

Theoretically, scholars as Dalton (1984) examine origin and structure of partisanship and political mobilization of citizens in two ways. Firstly, they argue that citizens are primarily mobilized through their attachment to political parties. Partisanship (measured as “closeness to a political party”) develops over time: as voters repeatedly vote for the same party, they become more attached to the party. In this explanation prospective voters rely on their parties for information; in fact the party is the information shortcut that informs voters’ choices and preferences. Thus, where partisanship is high, the party system will be stable due to long-term attachment to political parties.

Secondly, others would argue that voters, as their overall levels of education increase over time, and as mass media develops, rely less on political parties and more on their own cognitive skills to obtain the information needed to exercise a vote choice. Thus, one would expect a decline in partisanship to coincide with an increase in cognitive skills. Cognitive mobilization is predicted to be higher among the younger generations due to their higher levels of education and more exposure to mass media. Where cognitive mobilization is high, the party system will be unstable because attachment to parties is low. Voters who are mobilized through their own cognitive skills are ‘floating voters’ who show non ‘permanent’ attachment to any party but would or could vote for any party depending on their judgment on any single or combination of issues. Parties are thus no longer the ‘cue’ that informs the vote choice.

Dalton’s (1984) (2X2) grid provides four types of citizens with four motivational orientations with different effect on political coordination and process as below:

- ***Apolitical:*** Those who have both low partisanship and low cognitive mobilization.
- ***Ritual Partisans:*** Those with low cognitive mobilization but high partisanship.
- ***Apartisans:*** Those with low partisanship but high cognitive mobilization.
- ***Cognitive Partisans:*** Those with high cognitive mobilization and partisanship.

This theoretical implication provides the case that; most (62%) of respondents are cognitive partisans, derived by either cognitive or partisan reasons to engage in public affairs of political process of participation. Given partisan institutional identity is common to institutional past and advanced cognitive level of sample unit in case; it is logical to conclude the figure as correct.

15	What do you think as most primary to encourage active participation of citizens to discuss, shape and resolve administrative problems to their community or country?	Freq.	%
	Culture of respect or security for individuals with differing socio-political or personal point of view.	33	54.09
	Right or opportunity to participate	16	26.22
	Personal determination to address issues that matter ones rights and community	12	19.67

Table 15: issue that matter political motivation of citizens to participate on public affairs

The above table shows relative lack of intrinsic dispositions to take part in politics and solve problems to oneself and others in the community. This is clear from the figure that except 19.67% of respondents with purpose driven political interest and clear determination to solve problems that matter his/her rights and community at large; the remaining 80% of respondents seek external conditions to take part in public affairs.

Theoretically, the above table shows what Anderson and Guillory claims, that citizens who understand the political process and believe that their participation can influence policy making; they are likely to take a more optimistic view of democratic governance though more educated people are less likely to take part in politics and satisfied with democracy (Anderson and Guillory, 1997). They assert that people who are more interested in politics are more likely to be satisfied with the way democracy works in their country. This is clear from table 4, 6, 8 and others discussed above.

4.8. Summary of major findings

The review reveals that though the overall support for democracy and satisfaction with developmental premise as alternative version is highly affected by partisanship or organizational identity, as institutional effect associated with feudal and military legacy of favor politics; the case reveals the following figures that:”

- Most (57%) of respondents reflect ideal support for democracy despite the figure becomes only 23% when examined in order to verify actual level of commitment for democracy. The ideal nature of demand [commitment] for democracy appears empirical from statistical analysis of quantitative data, designed as simultaneous composite to help verify qualitative themes, in which except indexes regarding “*latent factors*” to capture confounding issues; all other covariates show that more than 95% statistical significance and 99% indirect but actual

significance. This implies that how much system level cultural [accepted institutional] values involve enduring effects that affected not only qualified dimensions and complex issues associated with efforts to achieve satisfaction but also reduced both simple approval at [57%] and deliberate commitment at [23%] for democracy as best system for governance. This figure appears far less than average demand for democracy among citizens in sub Sahara Africa with 69% ideal democrats and 46% actual or committed democrats.

- Contrary to scholar fact that attitude towards democracy, in Africa as result of political learning, involving combination of two top issues: “*performance evaluation*” and *cognitive awareness*”; the issue in case appears that the memories of “*institutional legacies*” mattered more than the two other factors combined, in conditioning support for democracy and satisfaction with supply.
- Most (70%) of respondents reflects high level of support for public interest, priorities, and grass root democratic values though becomes ideal when verified in relation to how materialize such mutual issues of public progress. The ideal nature of such commitment appears clear from less than average support provided to federal strategies and lack of tolerance for change in progress based on concept of *inter alia* or prolonged investment required to ensure such progress.
- Though far less than average; relatively significant number (29.5%) respondents are satisfied with the way democracy works in Ethiopia than range of general change brought in terms of possible democratic progress at current state of political affairs (22%).
- Most (65%) of participants perceive the regime as capable in terms of enforcing laws and sustaining civil administration though not in terms of policy issues of poverty, narrowing income gaps and fighting corruption. This means that most respondents perceive current regime as more important and successful than efficient and competent. This implies that most participants matter issues of “*efficiency*” more than “*consensuses*”.
- Most of participants trust civil representatives more than they trust political bodies. This implies that how effects of cultural values are enduring and remains powerful informal socio-political criteria to evaluate perceived and actual meaning, relevance and purpose of formal public institutions and its actors.
- Least level of trust provided for local authority shows lack of necessary social capital required to build political trust at institutional level which in turn echoes lessons to ensure

good governance at grass root level. The issue can also be inferred from least level of responsiveness, respondents fell towards readiness of elected officials to serve or listen public interests, which is function of transparency and accountability and thus implies lack of democratic [good] governance at grass root level.

- The overall level of support [commitment) for democracy remains at 23% compared to 30% general level of satisfaction with current supply. Though conditioned by lack of intrinsic commitment for democracy; the data shows that the relative level of satisfaction with economic achievement greater than level of satisfaction with political (civil) rights to freedom, association, security and political equality.
- Contrary to above key findings and surprisingly; the implication from both qualitative and quantitative dates collected from primary school teachers appear divergent to data collected from main sample in purposive site except in terms of lack of actual support for democracy, trust towards regime actors at local level on regarding issues of responsiveness and corruption. That means data collected from primary school teachers show that most (75) of them are satisfied with current supply of democracy and developmental efforts to ensure improved socio-economic goods and services compared to 30% among college instructors. They also grant more [74%] of ideal support for democracy compared to college instructors with [57%] ideal support for democracy. However committed support for democracy among primary school teachers remains at near zero level of 5%; far from 23% committed democrats among college instructors.

Chapter Five: Conclusion and recommendation

5.1. Conclusion

As informed case with professional concern to examine impact of system level cultural variables and effects of troubles usual to transitional trajectory on developmental efforts to democracy; the article reveals least level of demand for democracy and satisfaction with its supply. The study shows that demand for democracy is highly affected by preference for one or more of non democratic [cultural] alternatives and perceived satisfaction with regime performance (supply) affected by political status or organizational identity and partisan awareness, being winner or in support government in authority or loser or neutral, in political position. Since partisan institutional identification is widespread to Ethiopian political past and satisfaction with supply is found to be function of demand for democracy; the study identifies the issue as affect of ex-institutional culture, which conditioned, both demand for democracy and satisfaction with developmental supply; just because of political status with regime and its actor [government] in authority or other political bodies. That means the impact of traditional memories [cultural factor] seems powerful and its influence extends beyond demand for democracy. These are clear from ever high corruption perception and sever lack of political trust, those identified as problems common to feudal and military legacies of hierarchy and secrecy.

The other issues that there is sever lack of trust on local institutions and confidence on federal structure implies lack of good governance and local ability to administer themselves and establish good governance though effects of too common top down institutional memories are at interplay. Despite the interplay of such institutional memories, more especially memories of partisanship; most participants are interested with developmental ideologies and less interested with developmental structure, more especially federal frameworks. They are also less interested with *intra alia* (or prolonged effect of socio-political transformation and painful efforts or investment required to build and ensure such institutional transformation).

Moreover it indicates that these cultural factors are more important in conditioning perceived position towards regime and its actors than cognitive, political, economic or rational motives. Theoretically this implies the fact that both demand [commitment] for democracy and satisfaction with its achievements; is more affected by “*diffusive*” effects associated with institutional past than effects specific to present regime. That also means participants in the case defined socio-political purpose and relevance of current regime based on more of cultural memories than lack of rational or economic relevance of regime for them. This is clear from the facts that though they perceive relative importance of grass root values required to build democracy in cultural context and government strive to promote socio-economic opportunity for citizens and nation; they did not identify such strive and its actors as trusted, and free from favor motives, partisan awareness and corruption.

The other issue the review reveals is that contrary to other studies in sub saran Africa that the relative level of satisfaction with developmental supply appears greater than demand for democracy. It is also contrary to the theoretical fact that citizens with advanced educational status demand democracy more than they satisfied with its achievement; whether long established western democracies or new democracies, struggling with adjustment costs.

More again due to recognized effects, associated with being “*critical citizen*”, as in case and lack of purposive motives in an institutional culture; most of participants in case are passive and seeks external stimuli than has meaningful purpose, direct and inherent political interests.

5.2. Recommendations:

Thus the case comments the following implications that:

- Given low level of perceived responsiveness by state agencies to serve public and responsiveness as function of grass root official commitment to provide public service; the review resonate lack of credible public sentiments at local level. The issue can further imply problems associated with lack of good governance which can plausibly inferred from why such federal system argued to build democracy in plural society emerged as another entry to rent seeking in other studies [kutshel 2013] and perceived as challenge in case. This is the reason why most participants expressed their view as in open-ended questioner that: *federal arrangements involve social problems that to affect unity in diversity* implying lack of

good governance; rather that federalism or being different in social background matter or risk factor as itself.

- Given sever sense of partisan motivations among most participants in case; the required role they can play to developmental efforts to socio-political transformation, will remain at bounds of duty and other informal ties and seems lack of civic duty that go beyond personal obligation. That means most of respondents claim problems and solutions to our existing condition as effect of government or other external civil/ opposition political bodies than internal to individuals, groups and society at large ...the success or failure is because of this parties or that government or she, he..... In here it not implies that partisanship matters as itself but never to affect social, interpersonal or institutional meaning, purpose, relation, trust and potential progress at general level. Moreover if the regime requires some sort of special [higher order] collaboration from such citizens in case or other similar section of society; their contribution to its progress are indirect and so weak, given lack of active political interest among most of them and lack of clear demand for democracy.

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Appendix of Wording Questions and Codes

3.1. Preference for democracy

Table 1: Which of these statements is closest to your own opinion?

- a. Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government
- b. In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable
- c. For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have
- d. Don't know

Table 2: Support for Elements of Democracy

Which of the following statements is closest to your view?

[interviewed in a scaled constructs 1=Very strongly disagree” 2 = fairly disagree; 3=not sure, 4=fairly agree and 5= very strongly agree”]

- a. Government in Ethiopia is committed to solve any potential problem that can pose challenges on citizen's well being and national progress
- b. Development strategies to resolve group difficulties, as poverty at national level, support democratic freedom of individuals.
- c. Federal arrangements in our country addressed issues of social diversity via mutual equality and self administration.
- d. Common goods are complementary to support private rights, freedoms and opportunities.
- e. Citizens are more important for the process of building democracy and control unfair or corrupt official practices than government in place or system of rules
- f. The members of the National Assembly represent the people; therefore they should make laws for this country, even if the President does not agree
- g. Our present system of elected government should be given more time to deal with inherited problems
- h. Public participation to address social problems as poverty and corruption at local level promotes democracy more than any free & fair election at national level
- i. Civil servants or employees should have to act based on more of public interest and goals than personal interests or reasons.

3.2. Preference for non-democratic government

Table: 3. among many ways to govern, which of the following alternatives, you approve or disapprove?

- a. If one party system commands the state than ineffective democracies as in most of 3rd world nations.
- b. If all decisions were made by a council of elders, traditional leaders or chiefs
- c. If democracy governs based on our socio-cultural/historical values, beliefs & ways of life than to bring social change
- d. If military government commands affairs of the state based on concept of centralized presidential dictatorship

3.3 Performance of democracy

In your opinion, how much of a democracy is Ethiopia today?

- a. A full democracy

- b. A democracy, but with some minor problems/ exceptions
- c. A democracy, but with major problems/ exceptions
- d. Not a democracy
- e. Do not understand question or what a democracy is about
- f. Don't Know

Table 5: Positive Ratings of democracy as regime on selected procedural and substantive Issues

How much do you think that our current democracy ensures the following rights for citizens?
 [Rated in five point response scales organized as: very poor, poor, not sure, fairly well and very well positive end]

- a. Freedom to say what you think
- b. Freedom to join any political organization you want
- c. Fear of being arrested when you are innocent
- d. Freedom to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured
- e. The ability of ordinary people to influence what government does
- f. Equal and fair treatment for all people by government
- g. People have an adequate standard of living
- h. People have access to basic necessities
- i. Ethiopians are equal to one another

Table 6: Satisfaction with Democracy

Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Ethiopia? Are you...

- a. Very satisfied
- b. Fairly satisfied
- c. Not very satisfied
- d. Not at all satisfied
- e. Ethiopia is not a democracy

3.4. State Capacity and Government Performance

Table 7: Ability to Enforce the Law: How likely do you think it would be that the authorities could enforce the law if a person likes yourself... , each scaled as very likely, more likely, not sure, unlikely, very unlikely.

- a. Committed a serious crime
- b. Did not pay tax on some of the income they earned
- c. Obtained household services (like water & electricity) without paying

Table 8: The "Peoples' Agenda" - In your opinion, what are the most pressing problems facing this country that the government should have to address?

- a. Unemployment/Job creation
- b. Poverty or Destitution
- c. Food shortage or Famine
- d. Wages, income and salaries
- e. Education

Table 9: Positive Ratings of Government Performance on Selected Policy Issues

How well or badly would you evaluate that the government is handling the following issues?

- a. Creating jobs
- b. Keeping prices stable
- c. Narrowing income gaps

- d. Addressing educational needs
- e. Fighting corruption in government

3.5. Political Trust

Table 10: Perceived level of Trust in Selected Political Actors? - How much do you “trust” the following state agencies?

- a. Prime minister
- b. National Assembly
- c. Local Authority Councils
- d. Ruling Party
- e. Opposition Parties
- f. Police
- g. Traditional leaders
- h. Courts of law

3.6. Government Responsiveness

Table 11: How often do you think that elected leaders try their best to serve or listen to public interests?

- a. Never
- b. Some times
- c. Most times
- d. Always
- e. Don’t know

3.7. Corruption

Table 12: How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption? [Scales ranging from: **5** = all of them, 4= most of them, 3 = don’t know, 2= some of them and **1**= none of them, at right end]

- a. Officials in local government
- b. Government officials
- c. Police
- d. Judges & courts
- e. Local businessmen
- f. Teachers and school administrators
- g. Religious leaders
- h. Traditional leaders

Table 3: perceived propensity of participants towards corruption - Which would you say less harmful option if corrupt officials unable to provide timely response for your request to get social service or legal permission to do something

- a. Don’t worry, just wait, the permit will come
- b. Offer a tip or gift to the official
- c. Use connections to influential people
- d. Write a letter to the head office
- e. Do what you want without the permit
- f. Do nothing because nothing can be done
- g. Don’t know

3.8 Partisanship and Political Mobilization

Table 14: Whom do you think to mobilize, organize or direct people for political or economic purposes beyond election campaign?

- a. Government and other contending political parties
- b. Citizens to mobilize themselves as free agents based on their socio-political or economic interests and ends

Table 15: structure of political interest in terms of intrinsic and extrinsic motives - What do you think as **most** primary to encourage active participation of citizens to discuss, shape and resolve administrative problems to oneself and other in the community or country?

- a. Culture of respect or security for individuals with differing socio-political or personal point of view.
- b. Right or opportunity to participate
- c. Personal determination to address issues that matter ones rights and community

Instruction – 2 - Open ended questionnaires

1. How much you are interested/disinterested with concept of democracy (as general not about democracy in Ethiopia) and why?

I am *interested* with democracy because:

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

I am *less* interested with the concept of democracy because:

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

2. How do you evaluate state of democracy in Ethiopia?

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3. How much you think that our current democracy ensures protection of socio-economic and intellectual rights or freedoms for citizens? And why?

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4. Did you satisfied with the way democracy works in Ethiopia? If “**Yes**” how much?, if “**No**” why not?

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.....
.....
.....

5. To what extent do you think that our courts are capable of enforcing laws or prosecuting criminals?

.....
.....

Again how do you think that our system of public administration or those of courts are capable of enforcing laws against possible abuse of power that affects fair delivery of social services?

.....
.....
.....

6. How much or many of the problems to the country do you believe that the government can solve or addressed in past?

.....
.....

7. What do you think or observed are most pressing socio-economic problems to our country that government must to solve?

.....
.....

8. Did how much do you acknowledge effort of the government in managing issues of income equality and price stability as economic question in market process?

If **yes** how much, if **no**; why not?

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.....

How do you evaluate government strive in fight against corruption by civil and political officials?

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.....

9. How much do you trust or distrust representative function of official with respective legislative, executive, and judiciary role to the people?

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.....

Whose leadership you think more trusted among government or other alternative political parties and traditional authorities, in representing public affairs of state; why?

.....
.....
.....

10. Do you think that *elected political leaders* deliver expected social service to the people? If **yes** how much satisfactory? If not; why not?

.....
.....
.....

11. How much do you suppose those political leaders at national, regional or local levels of administrative functions are free from corruption?

.....
.....
.....

Do you think civil officials as educational or school leaders, police officers, religious and other traditional leaders engage in corruption?

If “**yes**” whom do you think as “**most**” corrupt and why?

.....
.....
.....

Why do you think that individuals and groups in private sector business/market process are free from corruption? and why not

.....
.....
.....

12. What can you do if administrative officials unable to provide timely response for your request to get social service or legal permission to do something?

.....

 13. Do you think government and other opposition parties to organize & direct political choice of people **or** the people should have to mobilize themselves based on what policy options provided by government or opposition parties?

If government and other opposition parties; why? **Or** If people to mobilize themselves; why?

.....

14. What do you think as most basic means to improve socio-political role of democracy and economic condition of citizens in our country?

.....

Questioner for executive officers

Please evaluate the following scaled items to sasses instructors sense of obligation to themselves government and society at large

Items		Scales				
Q	To what extent would you agree or disagree that the following applies to instructors in our college? [Response scale 1=Very strongly disagree” 2 = fairly disagree; 3 = not sure 4= agree and 5= very strongly agree”]	1	2	3	4	5
1	As public sector employees; instructors in our college strive to be efficient.					
2	Instructors strive to collaborate the policies decided upon by the top political leadership.					
3	Instructors strive to help clients.					
4	Instructors strive to follow rules.					
5	Instructors act based on public priorities to help common burdens to country, community or college.					
6	Instructors prioritize their duties over rights.					
7	Instructors go beyond their personal duties and prepared to share any burdens to society or government.					
8	Instructors are committed to prevent anti-democratic practices, biased or corrupt individuals, groups & officials, usual to emerging democracy.					
9	Instructors prioritize cooperation over competition regardless of political or personal difference, costs and benefits.					

```
GLM Q1 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q21 Q22 Q23 Q24 Q25 Q26 Q28 Q29 Q30 Q35 Q36 Q
37 Q38 Q39 Q40 Q41 Q42 Q43 Q47 Q49 Q52 BY Q27
/METHOD=SSTYPE (3)
/INTERCEPT=INCLUDE
/PRINT=ETASQ OPOWER PARAMETER
/CRITERIA=ALPHA (.05)
```


/DESIGN= Q27.

General Linear Model command results from backward regression

Notes

Output Created		
Comments		
Input	Data	C:\Users\change\Documents\SPSS.2_1.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing.
	Cases Used	Statistics are based on all cases with valid data for all variables in the model.
Syntax		GLM Q1 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q21 Q22 Q23 Q24 Q25 Q26 Q28 Q29 Q30 Q41 Q42 Q43 Q47 Q49 Q52 BY Q27 /METHOD=SSTYPE(3) /INTERCEPT=INCLUDE /PRINT=ETASQ OPOWER PARAMETER /CRITERIA=ALPHA(.05) /DESIGN= Q27.
Resources	Processor Time	
	Elapsed Time	

[DataSet1] C:\Users\change\Documents\SPSS.2_1.sav

Between-Subjects Factors

		Value Label	N
Equal and fair treatment of all people by government	1	Very well	4
	2	Fairly well	12
	3	Not sure	2
	4	Poor	17
	5	Very poor	25
	6	Extremely poor	1

Multivariate Tests^a

Effect		Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared	Noncent. Parameter	Observed Power ^b
Intercept	Pillai's Trace	.986	61.724 ^a	30.000	26.000	.000	.986	1851.710	1.000
	Wilks' Lambda	.014	61.724 ^a	30.000	26.000	.000	.986	1851.710	1.000

	Hotelling's Trace	71.220	61.724 ^a	30.000	26.000	.000	.986	1851.710	1.000
	Roy's Largest Root	71.220	61.724 ^a	30.000	26.000	.000	.986	1851.710	1.000
Q27	Pillai's Trace	3.099	1.630	150.000	150.000	.001	.620	244.461	1.000
	Wilks' Lambda	.004	1.779	150.000	133.686	.000	.662	261.989	1.000
	Hotelling's Trace	12.603	2.050	150.000	122.000	.000	.716	307.509	1.000
	Roy's Largest Root	7.285	7.285 ^c	30.000	30.000	.000	.879	218.553	1.000

a. Exact statistic

b. Computed using alpha = .05

c. The statistic is an upper bound on F that yields a lower bound on the significance level.

d. Design: Intercept + Q27

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Source	Dependent Variable	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared	Noncent. Parameter	Observed Power ^b
Corrected Model	Age	6.737 ^a	5	1.347	1.265	.292	.103	6.326	.414
	Educational level	.138 ^c	5	.028	.289	.917	.026	1.445	.116
	Year of service in this college	3.506 ^d	5	.701	.461	.803	.040	2.305	.163
	Current position	1.128 ^e	5	.226	1.058	.394	.088	5.290	.348
	statements close to your own opinion	1.583 ^f	5	.317	.447	.814	.039	2.234	.159
	Government in Ethiopia is committed to solve any potential problems that can pose challenges on citizens wellbeing & national progress	24.419 ^g	5	4.884	3.278	.012	.230	16.391	.862
	Development strategies to resolve group difficulties, as poverty at national level, support democratic and economic freedom of individuals.	20.250 ^h	5	4.050	2.630	.033	.193	13.149	.765
	Federal arrangements in our country addressed issues of social diversity via mutual equality and self administration.	29.537 ⁱ	5	5.907	3.628	.007	.248	18.142	.899

Common goods are complementary to support private rights, freedoms and opportunities.	24.773 ^j	5	4.955	3.949	.004	.264	19.747	.925
In your opinion, how much of a democracy is Ethiopia today	19.037 ^k	5	3.807	4.730	.001	.301	23.649	.965
Freedom to say what one thinks (speech)	31.742 ^l	5	6.348	4.115	.003	.272	20.576	.936
Freedom to join any political organization one wants	38.302 ^m	5	7.660	4.857	.001	.306	24.284	.969
Freedom from fear of being arrested when you are innocent	18.376 ⁿ	5	3.675	2.391	.049	.179	11.955	.718
Freedom to choose who to vote for without feeling forced	69.151 ^o	5	13.830	14.070	.000	.561	70.351	1.000
The ability of ordinary people to influence what government does	59.722 ^p	5	11.944	11.486	.000	.511	57.429	1.000
People have access to basic necessities	49.527 ^q	5	9.905	11.899	.000	.520	59.496	1.000
Ethiopians are equal to one another	44.495 ^r	5	8.899	8.430	.000	.434	42.149	.999
How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Ethiopia	22.080 ^s	5	4.416	5.226	.001	.322	26.128	.979
How well or badly would you evaluate the government strive in terms of creating jobs	9.972 ^t	5	1.994	1.647	.163	.130	8.233	.530
Keeping prices stable	18.551 ^u	5	3.710	2.680	.031	.196	13.401	.774
Narrowing income gaps	11.216 ^v	5	2.243	1.631	.167	.129	8.156	.526
Addressing educational needs of people	37.216 ^w	5	7.443	6.003	.000	.353	30.015	.991
Fighting corruption in government agency or officials	19.316 ^x	5	3.863	3.404	.009	.236	17.020	.876
Trust on prime minster	12.765 ^y	5	2.553	1.489	.208	.119	7.446	.484
National Assembly(parliament)	13.851 ^z	5	2.770	1.785	.131	.140	8.925	.570
Community Authority Councils	14.204 ^{aa}	5	2.841	2.158	.072	.164	10.792	.666
Ruling Party	45.823 ^{ab}	5	9.165	10.092	.000	.478	50.459	1.000

	How often do you think that elected leaders try their best to serve or listen to the public interests	13.469 ^{ac}	5	2.694	1.832	.122	.143	9.158	.582
	How many of officials in the local government do you think involved in corruption	15.032 ^{ad}	5	3.006	2.616	.034	.192	13.082	.762
	how many of local businessmen's do you think involved in corruption	16.054 ^{ae}	5	3.211	3.269	.012	.229	16.347	.861
Intercept	Age	88.932	1	88.932	83.505	.000	.603	83.505	1.000
	educational level	68.079	1	68.079	710.312	.000	.928	710.312	1.000
	Year of service in this college	113.732	1	113.732	74.786	.000	.576	74.786	1.000
	Current position	75.496	1	75.496	354.147	.000	.866	354.147	1.000
	statements close to your own opinion	55.459	1	55.459	78.263	.000	.587	78.263	1.000
	Government in Ethiopia is committed to solve any potential problems that can pose challenges on citizens wellbeing & national progress	203.744	1	203.744	136.755	.000	.713	136.755	1.000
	Development strategies to resolve group difficulties, as poverty at national level, support democratic and economic freedom of individuals.	105.853	1	105.853	68.734	.000	.555	68.734	1.000
	Federal arrangements in our country addressed issues of social diversity via mutual equality and self administration.	218.340	1	218.340	134.108	.000	.709	134.108	1.000
	Common goods are complementary to support private rights, freedoms and opportunities.	94.015	1	94.015	74.942	.000	.577	74.942	1.000
	In your opinion, how much of a democracy is Ethiopia today	203.897	1	203.897	253.292	.000	.822	253.292	1.000
	Freedom to say what one thinks (speech)	163.145	1	163.145	105.754	.000	.658	105.754	1.000
	Freedom to join any political organization one wants	215.390	1	215.390	136.563	.000	.713	136.563	1.000
	Freedom from fear of being arrested when you are innocent	221.423	1	221.423	144.050	.000	.724	144.050	1.000
	Freedom to choose who to vote for without feeling forced	192.839	1	192.839	196.185	.000	.781	196.185	1.000

	The ability of ordinary people to influence what government does	191.572	1	191.572	184.217	.000	.770	184.217	1.000
	People have access to basic necessities	159.926	1	159.926	192.116	.000	.777	192.116	1.000
	Ethiopians are equal to one another	220.400	1	220.400	208.777	.000	.791	208.777	1.000
	How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Ethiopia	205.540	1	205.540	243.228	.000	.816	243.228	1.000
	How well or badly would you evaluate the government strive in terms of creating jobs	196.844	1	196.844	162.516	.000	.747	162.516	1.000
	Keeping prices stable	285.582	1	285.582	206.299	.000	.790	206.299	1.000
	Narrowing income gaps	307.103	1	307.103	223.315	.000	.802	223.315	1.000
	Addressing educational needs of people	188.116	1	188.116	151.719	.000	.734	151.719	1.000
	Fighting corruption in government agency or officials	323.843	1	323.843	285.341	.000	.838	285.341	1.000
	Trust on prime minster	229.224	1	229.224	133.716	.000	.709	133.716	1.000
	National Assembly(parliament)	210.266	1	210.266	135.478	.000	.711	135.478	1.000
	Community Authority Councils	313.439	1	313.439	238.156	.000	.812	238.156	1.000
	Ruling Party	277.295	1	277.295	305.347	.000	.847	305.347	1.000
	How often do you think that elected leaders try their best to serve or listen to the public interests	269.621	1	269.621	183.322	.000	.769	183.322	1.000
	How many of officials in the local government do you think involved in corruption	120.367	1	120.367	104.755	.000	.656	104.755	1.000
	how many of local businessmen's do you think involved in corruption	105.432	1	105.432	107.361	.000	.661	107.361	1.000
Q27	Age	6.737	5	1.347	1.265	.292	.103	6.326	.414
	educational level	.138	5	.028	.289	.917	.026	1.445	.116
	Year of service in this college	3.506	5	.701	.461	.803	.040	2.305	.163
	Current position	1.128	5	.226	1.058	.394	.088	5.290	.348
	statements close to your own opinion	1.583	5	.317	.447	.814	.039	2.234	.159

Government in Ethiopia is committed to solve any potential problems that can pose challenges on citizens wellbeing & national progress	24.419	5	4.884	3.278	.012	.230	16.391	.862
Development strategies to resolve group difficulties, as poverty at national level, support democratic and economic freedom of individuals.	20.250	5	4.050	2.630	.033	.193	13.149	.765
Federal arrangements in our country addressed issues of social diversity via mutual equality and self administration.	29.537	5	5.907	3.628	.007	.248	18.142	.899
Common goods are complementary to support private rights, freedoms and opportunities.	24.773	5	4.955	3.949	.004	.264	19.747	.925
In your opinion, how much of a democracy is Ethiopia today	19.037	5	3.807	4.730	.001	.301	23.649	.965
Freedom to say what one thinks (speech)	31.742	5	6.348	4.115	.003	.272	20.576	.936
Freedom to join any political organization one wants	38.302	5	7.660	4.857	.001	.306	24.284	.969
Freedom from fear of being arrested when you are innocent	18.376	5	3.675	2.391	.049	.179	11.955	.718
Freedom to choose who to vote for without feeling forced	69.151	5	13.830	14.070	.000	.561	70.351	1.000
The ability of ordinary people to influence what government does	59.722	5	11.944	11.486	.000	.511	57.429	1.000
People have access to basic necessities	49.527	5	9.905	11.899	.000	.520	59.496	1.000
Ethiopians are equal to one another	44.495	5	8.899	8.430	.000	.434	42.149	.999
How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Ethiopia	22.080	5	4.416	5.226	.001	.322	26.128	.979
How well or badly would you evaluate the government strive in terms of creating jobs	9.972	5	1.994	1.647	.163	.130	8.233	.530
Keeping prices stable	18.551	5	3.710	2.680	.031	.196	13.401	.774
Narrowing income gaps	11.216	5	2.243	1.631	.167	.129	8.156	.526

Addressing educational needs of people	37.216	5	7.443	6.003	.000	.353	30.015	.991
Fighting corruption in government agency or officials	19.316	5	3.863	3.404	.009	.236	17.020	.876
Trust on prime minster	12.765	5	2.553	1.489	.208	.119	7.446	.484
National Assembly(parliament)	13.851	5	2.770	1.785	.131	.140	8.925	.570
Community Authority Councils	14.204	5	2.841	2.158	.072	.164	10.792	.666
Ruling Party	45.823	5	9.165	10.092	.000	.478	50.459	1.000
How often do you think that elected leaders try their best to serve or listen to the public interests	13.469	5	2.694	1.832	.122	.143	9.158	.582
How many of officials in the local government do you think involved in corruption	15.032	5	3.006	2.616	.034	.192	13.082	.762
how many of local businessmen's do you think involved in corruption	16.054	5	3.211	3.269	.012	.229	16.347	.861

Table 1 backward regression

Note: the most covariates are selected based on prediction/proposition except some cofounding indexes included to control inflation

Parameter estimates from **backward** regression to identify direct significance of a given covariate with respect to data point used to analysis.

Parameter/reflective Estimates

Dependent Variable	Parameter	B	Std. Error	t	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval		Partial Eta Squared	Noncent. Parameter	Observed Power ^a
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound			
Age	Intercept	1.000	1.032	.969	.337	-1.068	3.068	.017	.969	.159
	[Q27=1.00]	1.000	1.154	.867	.390	-1.312	3.312	.013	.867	.136
	[Q27=2.00]	.917	1.074	.853	.397	-1.236	3.069	.013	.853	.134
	[Q27=3.00]	2.500	1.264	1.978	.053	-.033	5.033	.066	1.978	.493
	[Q27=4.00]	1.412	1.062	1.329	.189	-.716	3.540	.031	1.329	.257
	[Q27=5.00]	1.280	1.052	1.216	.229	-.829	3.389	.026	1.216	.223
	[Q27=6.00]	0 ^b
educational level	Intercept	2.000	.310	6.460	.000	1.380	2.620	.431	6.460	1.000
	[Q27=1.00]	-.250	.346	-.722	.473	-.944	.444	.009	.722	.109
	[Q27=2.00]	-.083	.322	-.259	.797	-.729	.562	.001	.259	.057
	[Q27=3.00]	1.230E-15	.379	.000	1.000	-.760	.760	.000	.000	.050
	[Q27=4.00]	-.118	.319	-.369	.713	-.756	.521	.002	.369	.065
	[Q27=5.00]	-.080	.316	-.253	.801	-.713	.553	.001	.253	.057
	[Q27=6.00]	0 ^b
Year of service in this college	Intercept	2.000	1.233	1.622	.111	-.471	4.471	.046	1.622	.357
	[Q27=1.00]	2.331E-15	1.379	.000	1.000	-2.763	2.763	.000	.000	.050
	[Q27=2.00]	.333	1.284	.260	.796	-2.239	2.906	.001	.260	.057
	[Q27=3.00]	1.500	1.510	.993	.325	-1.527	4.527	.018	.993	.164
	[Q27=4.00]	.471	1.269	.371	.712	-2.072	3.014	.002	.371	.065
	[Q27=5.00]	.520	1.258	.413	.681	-2.000	3.040	.003	.413	.069
	[Q27=6.00]	0 ^b
Current position	Intercept	2.000	.462	4.332	.000	1.075	2.925	.254	4.332	.989
	[Q27=1.00]	-.250	.516	-.484	.630	-1.285	.785	.004	.484	.076
	[Q27=2.00]	.250	.481	.520	.605	-.713	1.213	.005	.520	.080
	[Q27=3.00]	2.263E-16	.565	.000	1.000	-1.133	1.133	.000	.000	.050
	[Q27=4.00]	.118	.475	.248	.805	-.834	1.070	.001	.248	.057
	[Q27=5.00]	-.040	.471	-.085	.933	-.984	.904	.000	.085	.051
	[Q27=6.00]	0 ^b
statements close to your own opinion	Intercept	2.000	.842	2.376	.021	.313	3.687	.093	2.376	.646
	[Q27=1.00]	-.250	.941	-.266	.792	-2.136	1.636	.001	.266	.058
	[Q27=2.00]	-.667	.876	-.761	.450	-2.423	1.089	.010	.761	.116
	[Q27=3.00]	1.644E-15	1.031	.000	1.000	-2.066	2.066	.000	.000	.050
	[Q27=4.00]	-.412	.866	-.475	.636	-2.148	1.324	.004	.475	.075

	[Q27=5.00]	-0.320	.858	-.373	.711	-2.040	1.400	.003	.373	.066
	[Q27=6.00]	0 ^b
Government in Ethiopia is committed to solve any potential problems that can pose challenges on citizens wellbeing & national progress	Intercept	5.000	1.221	4.096	.000	2.554	7.446	.234	4.096	.980
	[Q27=1.00]	-1.500	1.365	-1.099	.276	-4.235	1.235	.021	1.099	.191
	[Q27=2.00]	-2.917	1.270	-2.296	.026	-5.463	-.371	.087	2.296	.616
	[Q27=3.00]	-2.500	1.495	-1.672	.100	-5.496	.496	.048	1.672	.376
	[Q27=4.00]	-1.882	1.256	-1.499	.140	-4.399	.635	.039	1.499	.313
	[Q27=5.00]	-1.360	1.245	-1.093	.279	-3.855	1.135	.021	1.093	.189
	[Q27=6.00]	0 ^b
Development strategies to resolve group difficulties, as poverty at national level, support democratic and economic freedom of individuals.	Intercept	1.000	1.241	.806	.424	-1.487	3.487	.012	.806	.124
	[Q27=1.00]	2.000	1.387	1.441	.155	-.781	4.781	.036	1.441	.294
	[Q27=2.00]	1.000	1.292	.774	.442	-1.589	3.589	.011	.774	.118
	[Q27=3.00]	1.000	1.520	.658	.513	-2.046	4.046	.008	.658	.099
	[Q27=4.00]	1.941	1.277	1.520	.134	-.618	4.500	.040	1.520	.321
	[Q27=5.00]	2.360	1.266	1.865	.068	-.176	4.896	.059	1.865	.449
	[Q27=6.00]	0 ^b
Federal arrangements in our country addressed issues of social diversity via mutual equality and self administration.	Intercept	5.000	1.276	3.919	.000	2.443	7.557	.218	3.919	.971
	[Q27=1.00]	-1.750	1.427	-1.227	.225	-4.609	1.109	.027	1.227	.226
	[Q27=2.00]	-3.000	1.328	-2.259	.028	-5.662	-.338	.085	2.259	.602
	[Q27=3.00]	-2.000	1.563	-1.280	.206	-5.132	1.132	.029	1.280	.242
	[Q27=4.00]	-1.471	1.313	-1.120	.268	-4.102	1.161	.022	1.120	.196
	[Q27=5.00]	-1.240	1.301	-.953	.345	-3.848	1.368	.016	.953	.155
	[Q27=6.00]	0 ^b
Common goods are complementary to support private rights, freedoms and opportunities.	Intercept	1.000	1.120	.893	.376	-1.245	3.245	.014	.893	.142
	[Q27=1.00]	.750	1.252	.599	.552	-1.760	3.260	.006	.599	.091
	[Q27=2.00]	.667	1.166	.572	.570	-1.670	3.003	.006	.572	.087
	[Q27=3.00]	2.000	1.372	1.458	.151	-.749	4.749	.037	1.458	.299
	[Q27=4.00]	1.941	1.153	1.684	.098	-.369	4.251	.049	1.684	.380
	[Q27=5.00]	2.120	1.142	1.856	.069	-.169	4.409	.059	1.856	.446
	[Q27=6.00]	0 ^b
In your opinion, how much of a democracy is Ethiopia today	Intercept	3.000	.897	3.344	.001	1.202	4.798	.169	3.344	.907
	[Q27=1.00]	-.500	1.003	-.498	.620	-2.510	1.510	.004	.498	.078
	[Q27=2.00]	-.583	.934	-.625	.535	-2.455	1.288	.007	.625	.094
	[Q27=3.00]	2.000	1.099	1.820	.074	-.202	4.202	.057	1.820	.432
	[Q27=4.00]	.412	.923	.446	.657	-1.438	2.262	.004	.446	.072
	[Q27=5.00]	.520	.915	.568	.572	-1.314	2.354	.006	.568	.086
	[Q27=6.00]	0 ^b
Freedom to say what one thinks (speech)	Intercept	5.000	1.242	4.026	.000	2.511	7.489	.228	4.026	.977
	[Q27=1.00]	-3.750	1.389	-2.700	.009	-6.533	-.967	.117	2.700	.756
	[Q27=2.00]	-2.917	1.293	-2.256	.028	-5.507	-.326	.085	2.256	.601

	[Q27=3.00]	-2.000	1.521	-1.315	.194	-5.049	1.049	.030	1.315	.253
	[Q27=4.00]	-2.059	1.278	-1.611	.113	-4.620	.502	.045	1.611	.353
	[Q27=5.00]	-1.520	1.267	-1.200	.235	-4.058	1.018	.026	1.200	.218
	[Q27=6.00]	0 ^b
Freedom to join any political organization one wants	Intercept	5.000	1.256	3.981	.000	2.483	7.517	.224	3.981	.974
	[Q27=1.00]	-3.000	1.404	-2.137	.037	-5.814	-.186	.077	2.137	.555
	[Q27=2.00]	-2.583	1.307	-1.976	.053	-5.203	.036	.066	1.976	.493
	[Q27=3.00]	-2.000	1.538	-1.300	.199	-5.082	1.082	.030	1.300	.248
	[Q27=4.00]	-1.176	1.292	-.910	.367	-3.766	1.413	.015	.910	.146
	[Q27=5.00]	-.840	1.281	-.656	.515	-3.407	1.727	.008	.656	.099
	[Q27=6.00]	0 ^b
Freedom from fear of being arrested when you are innocent	Intercept	5.000	1.240	4.033	.000	2.515	7.485	.228	4.033	.977
	[Q27=1.00]	-2.250	1.386	-1.623	.110	-5.028	.528	.046	1.623	.358
	[Q27=2.00]	-2.417	1.290	-1.873	.066	-5.003	.169	.060	1.873	.452
	[Q27=3.00]	-2.000	1.518	-1.317	.193	-5.043	1.043	.031	1.317	.253
	[Q27=4.00]	-1.529	1.276	-1.199	.236	-4.086	1.027	.025	1.199	.218
	[Q27=5.00]	-1.120	1.264	-.886	.380	-3.654	1.414	.014	.886	.140
	[Q27=6.00]	0 ^b
Freedom to choose who to vote for without feeling forced	Intercept	5.000	.991	5.043	.000	3.013	6.987	.316	5.043	.999
	[Q27=1.00]	-3.750	1.108	-3.383	.001	-5.971	-1.529	.172	3.383	.914
	[Q27=2.00]	-2.917	1.032	-2.826	.007	-4.985	-.849	.127	2.826	.793
	[Q27=3.00]	-2.000	1.214	-1.647	.105	-4.433	.433	.047	1.647	.366
	[Q27=4.00]	-1.471	1.020	-1.442	.155	-3.515	.574	.036	1.442	.294
	[Q27=5.00]	-.560	1.011	-.554	.582	-2.586	1.466	.006	.554	.085
	[Q27=6.00]	0 ^b
The ability of ordinary people to influence what government does	Intercept	5.000	1.020	4.903	.000	2.956	7.044	.304	4.903	.998
	[Q27=1.00]	-3.750	1.140	-3.289	.002	-6.035	-1.465	.164	3.289	.898
	[Q27=2.00]	-2.917	1.061	-2.748	.008	-5.044	-.790	.121	2.748	.770
	[Q27=3.00]	-2.000	1.249	-1.601	.115	-4.503	.503	.045	1.601	.350
	[Q27=4.00]	-1.294	1.049	-1.233	.223	-3.397	.809	.027	1.233	.228
	[Q27=5.00]	-.800	1.040	-.769	.445	-2.884	1.284	.011	.769	.118
	[Q27=6.00]	0 ^b
People have access to basic necessities	Intercept	4.000	.912	4.384	.000	2.172	5.828	.259	4.384	.991
	[Q27=1.00]	-3.000	1.020	-2.941	.005	-5.044	-.956	.136	2.941	.824
	[Q27=2.00]	-1.833	.950	-1.931	.059	-3.736	.070	.063	1.931	.475
	[Q27=3.00]	-1.000	1.117	-.895	.375	-3.239	1.239	.014	.895	.142
	[Q27=4.00]	-.588	.939	-.627	.534	-2.470	1.293	.007	.627	.094
	[Q27=5.00]	4.481E-15	.930	.000	1.000	-1.865	1.865	.000	.000	.050
	[Q27=6.00]	0 ^b
Ethiopians are	Intercept	5.000	1.027	4.866	.000	2.941	7.059	.301	4.866	.998

equal to one another	[Q27=1.00]	-2.750	1.149	-2.394	.020	-5.052	-.448	.094	2.394	.652
	[Q27=2.00]	-2.583	1.069	-2.416	.019	-4.726	-.440	.096	2.416	.660
	[Q27=3.00]	-2.000	1.258	-1.589	.118	-4.522	.522	.044	1.589	.345
	[Q27=4.00]	-1.471	1.057	-1.391	.170	-3.589	.648	.034	1.391	.277
	[Q27=5.00]	-.560	1.048	-.534	.595	-2.660	1.540	.005	.534	.082
	[Q27=6.00]	0 ^b
How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Ethiopia	Intercept	4.000	.919	4.351	.000	2.158	5.842	.256	4.351	.990
	[Q27=1.00]	-.750	1.028	-.730	.469	-2.810	1.310	.010	.730	.111
	[Q27=2.00]	-1.750	.957	-1.829	.073	-3.667	.167	.057	1.829	.435
	[Q27=3.00]	-1.000	1.126	-.888	.378	-3.256	1.256	.014	.888	.141
	[Q27=4.00]	-.412	.946	-.435	.665	-2.307	1.484	.003	.435	.071
	[Q27=5.00]	-.160	.937	-.171	.865	-2.039	1.719	.001	.171	.053
[Q27=6.00]	0 ^b	
How well or badly would you evaluate the government strive in terms of creating jobs	Intercept	4.000	1.101	3.635	.001	1.794	6.206	.194	3.635	.946
	[Q27=1.00]	-.750	1.230	-.610	.545	-3.216	1.716	.007	.610	.092
	[Q27=2.00]	-1.667	1.145	-1.455	.151	-3.962	.629	.037	1.455	.298
	[Q27=3.00]	-.500	1.348	-.371	.712	-3.201	2.201	.002	.371	.065
	[Q27=4.00]	-.941	1.132	-.831	.410	-3.211	1.328	.012	.831	.129
	[Q27=5.00]	-.640	1.122	-.570	.571	-2.889	1.609	.006	.570	.087
[Q27=6.00]	0 ^b	
Keeping prices stable	Intercept	5.000	1.177	4.250	.000	2.642	7.358	.247	4.250	.987
	[Q27=1.00]	-2.250	1.315	-1.710	.093	-4.886	.386	.051	1.710	.390
	[Q27=2.00]	-2.083	1.225	-1.701	.095	-4.538	.371	.050	1.701	.387
	[Q27=3.00]	1.772E-15	1.441	.000	1.000	-2.888	2.888	.000	.000	.050
	[Q27=4.00]	-1.176	1.211	-.972	.335	-3.603	1.250	.017	.972	.159
	[Q27=5.00]	-1.000	1.200	-.833	.408	-3.405	1.405	.012	.833	.130
[Q27=6.00]	0 ^b	
Narrowing income gaps	Intercept	4.000	1.173	3.411	.001	1.650	6.350	.175	3.411	.918
	[Q27=1.00]	2.131E-15	1.311	.000	1.000	-2.628	2.628	.000	.000	.050
	[Q27=2.00]	-.667	1.221	-.546	.587	-3.113	1.779	.005	.546	.084
	[Q27=3.00]	1.000	1.436	.696	.489	-1.878	3.878	.009	.696	.105
	[Q27=4.00]	-.294	1.207	-.244	.808	-2.712	2.124	.001	.244	.057
	[Q27=5.00]	.320	1.196	.268	.790	-2.077	2.717	.001	.268	.058
[Q27=6.00]	0 ^b	
Addressing educational needs of people	Intercept	4.000	1.114	3.592	.001	1.768	6.232	.190	3.592	.942
	[Q27=1.00]	-1.250	1.245	-1.004	.320	-3.745	1.245	.018	1.004	.167
	[Q27=2.00]	-2.333	1.159	-2.013	.049	-4.656	-.011	.069	2.013	.507
	[Q27=3.00]	.500	1.364	.367	.715	-2.233	3.233	.002	.367	.065
	[Q27=4.00]	-1.412	1.146	-1.232	.223	-3.708	.884	.027	1.232	.228
	[Q27=5.00]	-.440	1.136	-.387	.700	-2.716	1.836	.003	.387	.067

	[Q27=6.00]	0 ^b
Fighting corruption in government agency or officials	Intercept	5.000	1.065	4.693	.000	2.865	7.135	.286	4.693	.996
	[Q27=1.00]	-1.750	1.191	-1.469	.147	-4.137	.637	.038	1.469	.303
	[Q27=2.00]	-1.833	1.109	-1.653	.104	-4.055	.389	.047	1.653	.369
	[Q27=3.00]	3.109E-15	1.305	.000	1.000	-2.615	2.615	.000	.000	.050
	[Q27=4.00]	-.882	1.096	-.805	.424	-3.079	1.315	.012	.805	.124
	[Q27=5.00]	-.520	1.086	-.479	.634	-2.697	1.657	.004	.479	.076
	[Q27=6.00]	0 ^b
Trust on prime minister	Intercept	4.000	1.309	3.055	.003	1.376	6.624	.145	3.055	.851
	[Q27=1.00]	-.250	1.464	-.171	.865	-3.184	2.684	.001	.171	.053
	[Q27=2.00]	-1.417	1.363	-1.040	.303	-4.148	1.314	.019	1.040	.175
	[Q27=3.00]	-.500	1.604	-.312	.756	-3.714	2.714	.002	.312	.061
	[Q27=4.00]	-.588	1.347	-.437	.664	-3.288	2.112	.003	.437	.071
	[Q27=5.00]	-.200	1.335	-.150	.881	-2.876	2.476	.000	.150	.052
	[Q27=6.00]	0 ^b
National Assembly (parliament)	Intercept	3.000	1.246	2.408	.019	.503	5.497	.095	2.408	.658
	[Q27=1.00]	.500	1.393	.359	.721	-2.291	3.291	.002	.359	.064
	[Q27=2.00]	-.333	1.297	-.257	.798	-2.932	2.265	.001	.257	.057
	[Q27=3.00]	.500	1.526	.328	.744	-2.558	3.558	.002	.328	.062
	[Q27=4.00]	.529	1.282	.413	.681	-2.040	3.098	.003	.413	.069
	[Q27=5.00]	.960	1.270	.756	.453	-1.586	3.506	.010	.756	.115
	[Q27=6.00]	0 ^b
Community Authority Councils	Intercept	5.000	1.147	4.358	.000	2.701	7.299	.257	4.358	.990
	[Q27=1.00]	-1.750	1.283	-1.364	.178	-4.320	.820	.033	1.364	.268
	[Q27=2.00]	-1.667	1.194	-1.396	.168	-4.060	.726	.034	1.396	.279
	[Q27=3.00]	3.292E-15	1.405	.000	1.000	-2.816	2.816	.000	.000	.050
	[Q27=4.00]	-1.294	1.180	-1.096	.278	-3.660	1.072	.021	1.096	.190
	[Q27=5.00]	-.680	1.170	-.581	.563	-3.025	1.665	.006	.581	.088
	[Q27=6.00]	0 ^b
Ruling Party	Intercept	5.000	.953	5.247	.000	3.090	6.910	.334	5.247	.999
	[Q27=1.00]	-2.000	1.065	-1.877	.066	-4.135	.135	.060	1.877	.454
	[Q27=2.00]	-2.917	.992	-2.941	.005	-4.904	-.929	.136	2.941	.824
	[Q27=3.00]	4.855E-15	1.167	.000	1.000	-2.339	2.339	.000	.000	.050
	[Q27=4.00]	-1.176	.981	-1.200	.235	-3.142	.789	.026	1.200	.218
	[Q27=5.00]	-.760	.972	-.782	.438	-2.708	1.188	.011	.782	.120
	[Q27=6.00]	0 ^b
How often do you think that elected leaders try their best to serve or listen to the public	Intercept	4.000	1.213	3.298	.002	1.570	6.430	.165	3.298	.900
	[Q27=1.00]	.250	1.356	.184	.854	-2.467	2.967	.001	.184	.054
	[Q27=2.00]	-1.083	1.262	-.858	.394	-3.613	1.446	.013	.858	.135
	[Q27=3.00]	-.500	1.485	-.337	.738	-3.477	2.477	.002	.337	.063

interests	[Q27=4.00]	.118	1.248	.094	.925	-2.383	2.619	.000	.094	.051
	[Q27=5.00]	.040	1.237	.032	.974	-2.439	2.519	.000	.032	.050
	[Q27=6.00]	0 ^b
How many of officials in the local government do you think involved in corruption	Intercept	4.000	1.072	3.732	.000	1.852	6.148	.202	3.732	.956
	[Q27=1.00]	-2.000	1.198	-1.669	.101	-4.402	.402	.048	1.669	.375
	[Q27=2.00]	-1.833	1.116	-1.643	.106	-4.069	.403	.047	1.643	.365
	[Q27=3.00]	-1.500	1.313	-1.143	.258	-4.131	1.131	.023	1.143	.202
	[Q27=4.00]	-1.176	1.103	-1.067	.291	-3.387	1.034	.020	1.067	.182
	[Q27=5.00]	-2.240	1.093	-2.049	.045	-4.431	-.049	.071	2.049	.521
	[Q27=6.00]	0 ^b
how many of local businessmen's do you think involved in corruption	Intercept	1.000	.991	1.009	.317	-.986	2.986	.018	1.009	.168
	[Q27=1.00]	.500	1.108	.451	.654	-1.720	2.720	.004	.451	.073
	[Q27=2.00]	1.583	1.031	1.535	.131	-.484	3.650	.041	1.535	.326
	[Q27=3.00]	3.500	1.214	2.884	.006	1.068	5.932	.131	2.884	.809
	[Q27=4.00]	1.529	1.020	1.500	.139	-.514	3.573	.039	1.500	.314
	[Q27=5.00]	1.160	1.011	1.148	.256	-.865	3.185	.023	1.148	.204
	[Q27=6.00]	0 ^b

a. Computed using alpha = .05

b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

Note

Sixth parameter is set by researcher to prevent effect of command rule

Table two: Parameter estimates from **Forward** regression to identify significance of interdependence of interdependence in a given covariate. In other words “A” is significant not because of itself but other factors or partial estimate squared.

NOTE: Significance is function of “**intercept:**” and *observed power*: 0.0001 or 0.8 and above respectively.

Parameter/reflective Estimates

<i>Dependent</i> Variables	<i>Parameter</i> <i>r</i>	B	Std. Error	t	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval		Partial Eta Squared	Noncent. Parameter	Observed Power ^a
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound			
Statements close to your own opinion	Intercept	1.357	.218	6.212	.000	.920	1.794	.395	6.212	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	.324	.249	1.301	.198	-.174	.822	.028	1.301	.249
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
Government in Ethiopia is committed to solve any potential problems that can pose challenges on citizens wellbeing & national progress	Intercept	2.500	.345	7.245	.000	1.810	3.190	.471	7.245	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	.862	.393	2.192	.032	.075	1.648	.075	2.192	.578
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
Development strategies to resolve group difficulties, as poverty at national level, support democratic and economic freedom of individuals.	Intercept	2.357	.348	6.768	.000	1.660	3.054	.437	6.768	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	.664	.397	1.674	.099	-.130	1.458	.045	1.674	.378
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
Federal arrangements in our country addressed issues of social diversity via mutual equality and self administration.	Intercept	2.857	.374	7.646	.000	2.109	3.605	.498	7.646	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	.590	.426	1.385	.171	-.262	1.441	.031	1.385	.270
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
Common goods are complementary to support private rights, freedoms and opportunities.	Intercept	2.429	.335	7.244	.000	1.758	3.099	.471	7.244	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	.295	.382	.772	.443	-.469	1.059	.010	.772	.118
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
Citizens are more important for the process of building democracy and fight against unfair or biased administrative practices than government in place or system of rules	Intercept	2.071	.324	6.388	.000	1.423	2.720	.409	6.388	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	-.114	.369	-3.09	.759	-.853	.625	.002	.309	.061
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
The members of the ‘national assembly’ represent the people; so they should make laws for this country.	Intercept	2.143	.325	6.603	.000	1.493	2.792	.425	6.603	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	.666	.370	1.800	.077	-.074	1.405	.052	1.800	.425
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b

Our present system of government should be given more time to deal with inherited problems.	Intercept	2.786	.361	7.717	.000	2.063	3.508	.502	7.717	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	.406	.411	.987	.328	-.417	1.229	.016	.987	.163
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
Public participation to address social problems as poverty and corruption at local level promotes democracy more than any free and fair election at national level	Intercept	3.000	.374	8.016	.000	2.251	3.749	.521	8.016	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	-.468	.426	-1.098	.277	-1.321	.385	.020	1.098	.193
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
Civil servants or employees should have to act based on more of public interest and goals than personal interests or reasons.	Intercept	1.714	.381	4.503	.000	.953	2.476	.256	4.503	.993
	[Q20=1.00]	.647	.434	1.493	.141	-.220	1.515	.036	1.493	.312
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
If one party system commands the state than ineffective democracies as in most of 3rd world nations.	Intercept	1.857	.127	14.572	.000	1.602	2.112	.783	14.572	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	-.325	.145	-2.240	.029	-.616	-.035	.078	2.240	.593
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
If all decisions were made by a council of elders, traditional leaders or chiefs.	Intercept	1.857	.127	14.572	.000	1.602	2.112	.783	14.572	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	-.389	.145	-2.680	.010	-.680	-.099	.108	2.680	.750
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
If democracy governs based on our socio-cultural/historical values, beliefs and ways of life than to bring political change.	Intercept	1.857	.116	16.007	.000	1.625	2.089	.813	16.007	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	-.581	.132	-4.392	.000	-.845	-.316	.246	4.392	.993
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
If military government commands affairs of the state based on concept of centralized presidential dictatorship	Intercept	2.000	.119	16.803	.000	1.762	2.238	.827	16.803	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	-.468	.136	-3.452	.001	-.739	-.197	.168	3.452	.924
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
In your opinion, how much of a democracy is Ethiopia today	Intercept	2.571	.258	9.961	.000	2.055	3.088	.627	9.961	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	.875	.294	2.977	.004	.287	1.464	.131	2.977	.833
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
Freedom to say what one thinks (speech)	Intercept	2.500	.371	6.747	.000	1.759	3.241	.436	6.747	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	.543	.422	1.285	.204	-.302	1.387	.027	1.285	.244
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
Freedom to join any political organization one wants	Intercept	2.643	.365	7.247	.000	1.913	3.373	.471	7.247	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	1.187	.415	2.857	.006	.356	2.018	.122	2.857	.802
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
Freedom from fear of being arrested when you are innocent	Intercept	2.643	.333	7.929	.000	1.976	3.310	.516	7.929	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	1.017	.380	2.678	.010	.257	1.777	.108	2.678	.750
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b

Freedom to choose who to vote for without feeling forced	Intercept	3.000	.380	7.900	.000	2.240	3.760	.514	7.900	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	.617	.433	1.426	.159	-.249	1.483	.033	1.426	.289
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
The ability of ordinary people to influence what government does	Intercept	3.000	.371	8.089	.000	2.258	3.742	.526	8.089	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	.553	.423	1.309	.196	-.292	1.399	.028	1.309	.251
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
Equal and fair treatment of all people by government	Intercept	3.500	.362	9.681	.000	2.777	4.223	.614	9.681	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	.394	.412	.956	.343	-.431	1.218	.015	.956	.150
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
People have access to basic necessities	Intercept	2.714	.330	8.215	.000	2.053	3.375	.534	8.215	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	.690	.376	1.833	.072	-.063	1.443	.054	1.833	.433
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
Ethiopians are equal to one another	Intercept	2.857	.334	8.545	.000	2.188	3.526	.553	8.545	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	.973	.381	2.553	.013	.210	1.735	.100	2.553	.709
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Ethiopia	Intercept	2.714	.270	10.056	.000	2.174	3.254	.632	10.056	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	.881	.307	2.867	.006	.266	1.497	.122	2.867	.803
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
How likely do you think state authorities enforce law if persons like yourself committed serious crimes	Intercept	1.786	.336	5.316	.000	1.114	2.458	.324	5.316	.999
	[Q20=1.00]	.853	.383	2.228	.030	.087	1.618	.078	2.228	.592
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
Did not pay tax on some of income they earned	Intercept	2.143	.343	6.252	.000	1.457	2.829	.399	6.252	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	.261	.390	.669	.506	-.520	1.043	.008	.669	.103
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
Obtained domestic services as water & electricity without paying	Intercept	2.500	.375	6.672	.000	1.750	3.250	.430	6.672	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	.394	.427	.922	.360	-.461	1.248	.014	.922	.142
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
Which do you think the most pressing problem facing this country that the government should have to address	Intercept	2.214	.301	7.349	.000	1.611	2.817	.478	7.349	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	.616	.343	1.793	.078	-.071	1.302	.052	1.793	.422
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
How well or badly would you evaluate the government strive in terms of creating jobs	Intercept	2.571	.295	8.718	.000	1.981	3.162	.563	8.718	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	.663	.336	1.972	.053	-.010	1.335	.062	1.972	.492
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
Keeping prices stable	Intercept	3.643	.338	10.763	.000	2.966	4.320	.663	10.763	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	.081	.386	.209	.835	-.691	.852	.001	.209	.055
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
Narrowing income gaps	Intercept	3.857	.324	11.906	.000	3.209	4.505	.706	11.906	1.000

	[Q20=1.00]	.122	.369	.329	.743	-.617	.860	.002	.329	.062
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
Addressing educational needs of people	Intercept	2.214	.342	6.467	.000	1.529	2.899	.415	6.467	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	.892	.390	2.287	.026	.112	1.673	.081	2.287	.614
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
Fighting corruption in government agency or officials	Intercept	3.429	.300	11.427	.000	2.828	4.029	.689	11.427	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	.827	.342	2.419	.019	.143	1.511	.090	2.419	.662
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
Trust on prime minster	Intercept	3.000	.354	8.475	.000	2.292	3.708	.549	8.475	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	.574	.403	1.425	.160	-.232	1.381	.033	1.425	.289
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
National Assembly(parliament)	Intercept	3.214	.344	9.357	.000	2.527	3.902	.597	9.357	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	.403	.391	1.029	.308	-.380	1.186	.018	1.029	.173
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
Community Authority Councils	Intercept	3.571	.320	11.172	.000	2.932	4.211	.679	11.172	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	.450	.364	1.235	.222	-.279	1.179	.025	1.235	.229
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
Ruling Party	Intercept	3.214	.334	9.619	.000	2.546	3.883	.611	9.619	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	.573	.381	1.505	.138	-.189	1.335	.037	1.505	.310
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
Opposition Parties	Intercept	3.786	.341	11.113	.000	3.104	4.467	.677	11.113	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	-.360	.388	-.928	.357	-1.137	.416	.014	.928	.150
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
Traditional leaders	Intercept	3.357	.373	8.996	.000	2.610	4.104	.578	8.996	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	-.655	.425	-1.541	.129	-1.506	.196	.039	1.541	.329
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
Courts of law	Intercept	3.214	.314	10.251	.000	2.587	3.842	.640	10.251	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	.424	.357	1.187	.240	-.291	1.139	.023	1.187	.215
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
How often do you think that elected leaders try their best to serve or listen to the public interests	Intercept	3.143	.322	9.761	.000	2.499	3.787	.618	9.761	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	.900	.367	2.453	.017	.166	1.634	.093	2.453	.675
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
How many of executive officials at federal level do you think involved in corruption	Intercept	2.857	.300	9.537	.000	2.258	3.457	.607	9.537	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	-.623	.341	-1.826	.073	-1.306	.060	.053	1.826	.435
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
How many of officials in the local government do you think	Intercept	2.429	.306	7.934	.000	1.816	3.041	.516	7.934	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	-.280	.349	-.802	.426	-.977	.418	.011	.802	.124

involved in corruption	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
How many of police officers do you think involved in corruption	Intercept	3.071	.325	9.456	.000	2.421	3.721	.602	9.456	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	-.391	.370	-1.056	.295	-1.131	.350	.019	1.056	.180
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
how many of judges in court do you think involved in corruption	Intercept	3.071	.345	8.906	.000	2.381	3.762	.573	8.906	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	-.476	.393	-1.211	.231	-1.262	.311	.024	1.211	.222
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
how many of local businessmen's do you think involved in corruption	Intercept	2.571	.290	8.880	.000	1.992	3.151	.572	8.880	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	-.274	.330	-.829	.410	-.934	.387	.012	.829	.129
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
how many of school administrators	Intercept	3.286	.337	9.757	.000	2.612	3.960	.617	9.757	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	-.222	.384	-.578	.565	-.990	.546	.006	.578	.088
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
How many of religious leaders do you think involved in corruption	Intercept	4.000	.350	11.421	.000	3.299	4.701	.689	11.421	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	-.596	.399	-1.493	.141	-1.394	.203	.036	1.493	.312
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
How many of traditional leaders	Intercept	3.714	.338	10.995	.000	3.038	4.390	.672	10.995	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	-.438	.385	-1.137	.260	-1.208	.332	.021	1.137	.200
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b
Which would you say less harmful option to deal permission from corrupt officials	Intercept	4.429	.515	8.606	.000	3.399	5.458	.557	8.606	1.000
	[Q20=1.00]	-.024	.586	-.041	.967	-1.197	1.149	.000	.041	.050
	[Q20=2.00]	0 ^b

a. Computed using alpha = .05

b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.