Abstract:
Contemporarily it is axiomatic that individuals, organizations and states rely on the cyber space
and its tools for their everyday activities ranging from sending an email to controlling critical
system and infrastructure. Alongside such extensive utilization there arises a great risk that such
systems and infrastructures may became the target of malicious cyber-attacks by the adversary
during armed conflict. This raises a question whether and, if so, how the existing rules of IHL
apply to cyber warfare cases. In this respect there is a general consensus that cyber-attacks that
amount to or carried out in the context of an armed conflict are subjected to the existing rules and
principles of IHL. The controversy lies on how to transpose the existing rules of IHL to a warfare
conducted in cyberspace through cyber means and methods, if they are meant to achieve the
objective of protecting victims of armed conflict. By following a consequence based interpretation
of armed conflict and attack this paper argues that for the most part the existing rules of IHL seems
to provide sufficient protection to victims of armed conflict. However, given the unique features of
the cyber space there are some problems that require the evolvement of the existing rules of IHL.
