Community Recognition Incentive Scheme for Social Aware Networks

Abstract

For improving the network performance of today's Internet a new paradigm called Social Aware Networks (SANs) is emerged. This new paradigm of network exploits social properties of involved entities or mobile users to guide the design of protocols due to the human centric nature of recent mobile networks. Because of nodes’ mobility, it is difficult to maintain an end-to-end connectivity between source and destination. As a result, the research efforts come up with this new network paradigm as solution to existing challenges. This new paradigm considers social properties of individuals for developing different forwarding algorithms and improve the connectivity among nodes. In order to achieve a better performance, the cooperation among nodes is important such as participation of well-behaving nodes are considered to be the default scenario for most of the exiting protocols in this networking environment. However, due to selfishness (misbehaving) nature of individuals, some nodes conserve their resources such as buffer spaces. This brings data forwarding activity degraded in terms performance evaluation metrics such as delivery ratio. Therefore, in this work an incentive mechanism among social selfish nodes for data forwarding activity to improve the performance based on community recognition incentive scheme called CRIS is proposed. The implementation of this work is employed tit for tat strategy to forward data among nodes of different communities as mutual benefit of encounter nodes to tackle selfishness behavior of nodes. To promote cooperation among nodes first grouped them into a communities based on their interest. Then nodes give forwarding service to each other within inter-community communication to get recognition value. The evaluation result compares the proposed scheme with non-incentive and selfishness routing mechanisms and also existing works in terms of delivery ratio, overhead ratio, hopcount and average latency. The results illustrate that community recognition incentive scheme outperforms both mechanisms (non-incentive and selfishness routing mechanisms) and other incentive schemes with higher message delivery ratio, less overhead ratio and high hop counts. At optimal message generation time intervals, delivery ratio of CRIS is 94% while 71% and 50% for non-incentive and selfishness routing mechanisms, respectively. In terms of overhead ration, non incentive scheme is less than both schemes which is 63 in CRIS while 65 for selfishness routing scheme.